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ABSTRACT
Is right-wing terrorism a response to rising immigration levels? I argue that influxes
of immigrants into host states create a motive for violence to members of the extreme-
right because it embodies an inherent threat to the ideological imperative of the political
movement. I argue that two opportunity structures serve as justifications for acting on the
motive. First, a domestic economic opportunity structure arises when both the economy
is declining and when immigration becomes a salient national issue. These conditions
produce an opportunity for action by creating a context in which immigration can be linked
to a declining economy. Second, a spatial opportunity structure arises when extreme-right
attacks occur in proximate geographical areas. In this case, attacks that occur nearby
that are clearly identified as an expression of the extreme-right ideology can legitimate
subsequent attacks, serve as a template for emulating that behavior, and may also create the
perception among the terrorists that the government is reaching a tipping point. I test these
arguments in a cross-national empirical analysis of 18 Western European Countries from
1970 to 2004 as well as in a sub-national analysis of English administrative regions from
1998 to 2005. The cross-national analysis generated strong evidence for the economic
opportunity argument and no evidence to support the spatial opportunity argument. The
results were highly consistent across all models. In contrast, the sub-national analysis
indicated support for the spatial opportunity argument and no support for the economic
opportunity argument. The construction of the spatial lag in the cross-national context
versus the sub-national context most likely accounts for the these disparate findings.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In an April 2012 court testimony concerning the massacre of 77 people in Norway
on July 22, 2011, Anders Breivik confessed that the attacks “were necessary to protect
Norway from being taken over by Muslims” (Rickman 2012). Five months later, Gian-
luca Casseri, a member of the extreme-right group Casa Pound, opened fire on several
Senegalese street traders at a busy market in Florence, Italy, killing two men and injur-
ing three more in an effort to symbolize his opposition to immigration (Squires 2011). In
2007, Robert Cottage, a former three-time British National Party (BNP) candidate, was
imprisoned for stockpiling chemical explosives, allegedly due to his fear of uncontrolled
immigration and a potential civil war (Campbell 2007). In Greece, a surge in acts of polit-
ically motivated racist violence have spread across the country since the national elections
of May and June, 2012, thought to be largely inspired by the heightened success and
subsequent rise in anti-immigrant appeals by the far-right Golden Dawn party (Becatoros
2012).
Although these are recent examples, extreme-right ideologically motivated terrorism
is not a new phenomenon. Historically, Western Europe experienced roughly two major
waves of right-wing violence during the second half of the twentieth century. The first
was largely a response to the widespread threat of communism after World War II. The
second period is associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War, which brought about influxes of foreign minority populations into Western European
states. This, combined with the earlier dissolution of seasonal guest-worker programs in
the 1970s, largely due to the labor market effects of the 1973 oil price shock, generated
permanent migrant communities across the region. Violence from the far right is thought to
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have resulted from the subsequent fear of economic competition and deteriorating national
identities (Engene 2011; Transnational Terrorism, Security, & the Rule of Law 2008).
Recently, we have witnessed dramatic fluctuations in acts of extreme-right terrorism
in Western Europe, several of which resulting in some of the most deadly incidents of
domestic terrorism in the region.1 Numerous government agencies warn that violence
from the extreme-right is continuing to pose a serious societal threat throughout the world
with little prospect of abating in the near future (Department of Homeland Security 2009;
Europol 2011; Transnational Terrorism, Security, & the Rule of Law 2008).
These recent events have spurred renewed interest in the subject among academics and
policymakers. In part, this is do to the clear evidence for growing ideological support for
far-right political platforms across the region as well as unsettling survey evidence reveal-
ing a rising willingness among the public to use violence as a justification for far-right in-
spired policy change (Goodwin and Evans 2012). These trends coincide with the fact that
we still know very little about the environmental or structural contexts that motivate this
particular type of ideologically driven violence. In addition, groups typically associated
with far-right ideology are exhibiting increasingly diffuse and fragmented organizational
structures with smaller networks of peripheral followers who are not formal members. The
ideological movement then appears to be a “resting place” for those particularly extreme
individuals on the periphery of the organization, who are more likely to utilize violence as
a justification for policy change. Subsequent acts of violence then tend to be less severe
but of higher frequency than the traditional conception of large-scale mass terrorist cam-
paigns, muddling the definitional gap between terrorism and extremist crimes (Goodwin
2012a).
1E.g. The 1980 bombing of the Bologna railway station by the Italian Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari
resulted in 85 deaths and over 200 injuries. See Engene (2007).
2
This type of violence has the potential to pose problems for national security efforts.
Europol reports suggest that it is increasingly difficult to not only monitor the behavior of
these groups, due to their diffuse structures, but it is also unclear how to effectively re-
spond, particularly in the liberal democratic setting, without creating further backlash and
stronger ideological support for the movements (Europol 2011). It is not the case that right-
wing attacks are more prevalent or more severe than other types of attacks with different
motivations such as left-wing, ethno-nationalist, or special interest terrorism. Prevalence
and severity are only two among many potential reasons for studying a particular type of
violence. If scholars of conflict only concerned themselves with studying its most preva-
lent forms, we might only know about anti-government riots. If severity was the only
concern, we might only understand interstate or (more recently) intra-state state wars.
Right-wing terrorism is worth studying as a form of violence simply because it exists and
we have a very limited understanding of why it occurs. However, if one is compelled
to justify its study through its prevalence and severity then we should be aware that the
explanatory factors I draw on in the following chapter (e.g. international migration rates,
unemployment rates, extreme-right party success) are only expected to increase in the
near and long-term future, which would suggest the potential for extreme-right terrorism
to only increase as well.
In addition, extreme-right terrorism is not simply a result of one major international
crisis such as the breakdown of earlier fascist regimes or the dissolution of the former
Soviet Union. Just as well, it is not specific to a particular month, year, or decade. It
is, and has been, an ongoing phenomenon for over half a century in Western Europe and
yet we still have an incredibly limited understanding of the factors that contribute to its
occurrence. Matthew Goodwin, a well-known expert on the subject, has made a strong
effort to raise greater awareness of this to the relevant academic communities in recent
years. “We actually know very little about the relationship between the more organized
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extreme-right organizations and incidents of violence. Is such violence more likely in
states and regions that have a well-organized far right? What is the profile and motive
among those who commit acts of right-wing extremist violence? The answers to these and
other questions have yet to be found, and they deserve much more attention than they are
receiving” Goodwin (2013a)
In reviewing native reactions to the most recent wave of immigrants to Europe, Pet-
tigrew (1998) states, “The world is experiencing two major intergroup trendsmassive mi-
gration and increased group violence” (77). Is right-wing terrorism a response to rising
foreign minority populations? If so, then why do countries such as the Netherlands and
Sweden experience relatively few right-wing terrorist incidents while Germany and Italy
experience a relatively high number when all four have similar year to year net influxes of
foreign born populations? The extreme-right’s ideological opposition to immigration sug-
gests there is a strong theoretical reason to connect migrant inflows to right-wing terrorism
but the empirical variation suggests that more is going on.
In order to gain further traction on this puzzle, the remainder of this introductory chap-
ter will elaborate on how to proceed in conceptualizing and defining the “extreme-right”
as an independent ideological genre as well as discuss definitional differences in acts of
terrorism versus extremist crimes. It will review relevant literature and evidence thus far
put forth in explaining motivations for right-wing violence and it will offer a brief state-
ment of the larger theoretical argument original to this dissertation. I will then discuss both
the theoretical and methodological approaches taken in later chapters to identify the link
between immigration and extreme-right terrorism. Finally, the chapter will conclude with
a brief discussion of the empirical findings and the potential implications of those findings
relevant to policymakers and for future academic work on the subject.
4
1.1 Defining the Extreme-Right
Generating a clear and uniform definition of the extreme-right political movement has
proven notoriously difficult (Hainsworth 1992, 2000; Mudde 2007). In fact, roughly 28
separate definitions involving over 60 different subcomponents have been offered in the
literature (Mudde 2007). However, more recently there appears to be greater consensus
on the broad identifying traits that make up the overall movement (Perliger 2013). There
are two definitional levels one must address when analyzing the political movement. The
first level is making the distinction among various ideological motivations or issue areas.
For example, does the movement exhibit nationalist values or anti-immigrant sentiment or
both? Are these ideologies overlapping or substantively different concerning subsequent
behavior toward policy change? Second, one must clarify the corresponding set of actors
or groups who make up the ideological movements. For example, are these groups po-
litical parties, non-electoral extremist groups, terrorist organizations, or loosely affiliated
peripheral followers?
Further there are numerous terms that are often used interchangeably to describe the
movement including “far-right,” “radical-right,” “neo-fascist,” “right-wing populist,” and
“neo-nationalist.” Although Betz and Immerfall (1998) suggest that the term “extreme-
right” connotes an association with a rejection of representative democracy, I follow Hainsworth
(2000) and Mudde (2007) in using the term “extreme-right” or “far-right” (and who ar-
gue that these are the broadly accepted terms) mainly to differentiate from the “main-
stream right.” In addition, ideology is defined here as, “The beliefs, values, principles, and
objectives–however ill-defined or tenuous–by which a group defines its distinctive political
identity and aims” (Drake 1998).
The ideological position of the extreme-right historically centers on nationalist senti-
ments, the preservation of racial purity and societal homogeneity, opposition to globalizing
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forces and international economic integration, as well as an authoritarian and sometimes
fascist governing structure (Eatwell 2004; Hagtvet 1994). More recently, waves of anti-
Islamic sentiment or so-called “counter-Jihad” groups have emerged. For example, Great
Britains English Defence League, formed in 2009, has a stated mission “to protect the in-
alienable rights of all people to protect against radical Islam’s encroachment into the lives
of non-Muslims” (English Defense League Mission Statement 2013). However, because
the claims of religious intrusion and that of “Islamification” in particular are largely linked
to foreign minority settlement, immigration appears to still be the most pervasive policy
issue for these groups (Goodwin 2013b). In contrasting the conceptual distinctions among
far-right groups in the United States with those in Europe, Perliger (2013) notes, “in Eu-
rope it appears that the role of religion is more marginal, and immigration and integration
policies are the hallmark of far-right rhetoric” (13).
One of the most common ideological factors across the movement is nationalist senti-
ment. Nationalism in the far-right context is increasingly seen as the intimate connection
between race and nation (Hainsworth 2000). In other words, there is a desire for the pop-
ulation existing within the territorial boundaries of the state to exhibit homogenous ethnic
characteristics. A critical element of nationalism in this sense is the concept of nativism,
which is the outright rejection of those who do not exhibit the ethnic or cultural character-
istics associated with a particular nation. This outside influence is seen as a potential threat
to the longevity of the national/cultural tradition. It threatens the societal homogeneity that
is seen as defining the nation itself. The subsequent behaviors and attitudes toward foreign
minorities that stem from nativist ideology are often referred to as acts of xenophobia or
racism.
The extreme-right is also often characterized by its authoritarian and fascist ideology,
which is represented through a “strong state” mentality. In other words, there is a desire for
strict law and order maintained by a hierarchical governing structure, which is also largely
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opposed to economic integration and globalizing forces. Carter (2005) defines right-wing
extremism as “a particular form of political ideology defined by two anti-constitutional and
anti-democratic elements.” First, right-wing extremists reject the institutional features that
define the democratic state and tend to openly call for the overthrow of those institutions.
This is contrasted with more formal extreme-right political parties who, although critical
of these institutions, tend to openly accept them as a means to gain further political power.
Second, right-wing extremist groups tend to reject the concept of ‘liberalism’ or more
generally, the principle of human equality and often utilize what is termed, ‘direct action
methods.’ These involve either violently targeting minority groups or those responsible for
the growth in multiculturalism. This is again contrasted with extreme-right political parties
who also openly reject liberal principles but only advocate for exclusionary policies rather
than using violence as a method.
Nostalgia for traditional values and close native communities drives this push for anti-
liberal political and economic policies. This is why we sometimes see acts of vigilantism
or groups who decide to assist the state in carrying out legal punishment (Pedhazur and
Perliger 2003). For example, several militias in California, Arizona, and Texas in the U.
S. physically capture and return illegal immigrants back across the U. S.-Mexican border.
As Drake (1998) argues, “What is important is that ideology provides a motive and
framework for action” (55). Because of these core ideological characteristics, immigration
naturally poses a threat to the movement, thus creating a motive for action. Although
there are certainly distinct differences among the various groups that make up the far
right, Pettigrew (1998) argues that the central theme pervades them is “nativism and stern
opposition to immigration” (91). This is not unexpected. A liberal-democratic governing
structure that continues to push for the incorporation and integration of foreign ethnic
groups should present a clear problem for those who want to preserve cultural traditions,
racial homogeneity, and prevent societal change. Each of the core characteristics, whether
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it be nationalist sentiment or opposition to economic integration, leads to the motivation
for a closed border policy. Therefore, even if there exists variation among the above-
mentioned ideological features across far-right groups, opposition to open immigration
policy should remain a key policy issue.2
In addition to clarifying the core ideological motivations and issue areas that make
up the far right, it is also important to identify the potential corresponding set of actors
or groups who make up the movement. The types of groups that hold extreme-right ide-
ologies in Western Europe are increasingly diverse. Although not all members engage
in or advocate violence as a political strategy, many organizations do explicitly promote
violence as a strategy to achieve policy change. Drawing on earlier attempts to classify or-
ganizational subtypes, Goodwin (2012a) identifies four broad group categories that make
up the overall movement. First, and what is likely to be the most familiar manifestation
of the movement, are organized political parties who pursue electoral gain for political
influence. These parties tend to pursue strategies of influence that are within the estab-
lished legal boundaries of the state with the goal of moving out of the electoral fringe and
into the mainstream in order to more effectively change the status quo. Examples include
the British National Party (BNP) in Great Britain, the Front National (FN) in France, the
Vlaams Blok (VB) in Belgium, and the Freiheiliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO, Freedom
Party of Austria) in Austria.
A major subset of these political parties are those described as anti-establishment or
anti-systemic parties. These parties construct a clear and distinct opposition to the cur-
rent set of status quo policy preferences. They align themselves in direct opposition to
the dominant social and political values that permeate the system and side with “ordinary
citizens” against a system with elites who promote these dominant values. Tension is pro-
2At the base of all extreme-right movements is extreme nationalist sentiment. So, although we observe a
number of specific campaigns from the far-right against things like new businesses promoting Indian cuisine,
the building of mosques, etc., the perceived cause of these developments is open immigration policy.
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moted between traditional elites and grassroots society in order to influence policy. These
parties also claim to defend ordinary society against external threats such as immigrants
and their cultural influences (Almeida 2012).
The second organizational subtype is the grassroots social movement. These groups
seek political influence but do not necessarily seek electoral gain. They are large groups
of individuals who share an ideological affiliation and who view this ideology as a major
component of their collective identity. Grassroots movements utilize provocative rallies
and demonstrations to promote their cause through the media, to more clearly distinguish
this cause from the causes of their ideological opponents, and to recruit new members.
These groups tend to be more fragmented than political parties and exhibit a more diverse
horizontal substructure, with core members who are highly active in the movement and
peripheral members who are less participatory but exhibit more extreme views (Goodwin
and Evans 2012). It is also possible for groups to move in and out of these two orga-
nizational categories over time or even exhibit qualities of both a formal political party
as well as a grassroots movement. For example, the Golden Dawn in Greece began as
a small group of neo-nazis throughout the early 2000s but became a successful political
party gaining over seven percent of the national vote in 2012 with tens of thousands of
members. The party also shows several qualities of a grassroots movement by regularly
staging rallies, providing primary education throughout the country, and by holding local
soup kitchens for unemployed native Greek citizens.
The third subtype includes smaller group networks that act independently from politi-
cal parties and social movements. These groups do not necessarily attempt to mass recruit
and are typically made up of closely affiliated individuals with more extreme positions and
often a greater proclivity for violence. These smaller groups tend to be labeled terrorist
organizations because they are more prone to engaging in violence and justify the violence
with more extreme political views, which more clearly fits the definition of terrorism than
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perhaps other types of violence (this point will be discussed further in the following sec-
tion of this chapter). As with grassroots movements and unlike formal political parties,
these smaller networks present definitional challenges in that the boundaries of member-
ship are often fluid. Bjorgo (2009) makes the distinction between bounded and unbounded
groups. Individuals in leadership and who hold decision making power within a group
are considered to be bounded in the sense that their membership is formally solidified by
popular vote or through some means of initiation. Those outside of the leadership echelon
are unbounded in that there are rarely formal membership duties creating the ability to
move in and out and across different groups. This makes it difficult to attribute a specific
ideological affiliation to many individuals. Examples of these groups include the Youth
Action Group in France and Combat 18 in Great Britain. Drake (1998) further elaborates
on this point:
There may be a distinction between the professed ideology of a group and the
actual beliefs of individual members. The leaders of political groups usually
have a fairly specific ideology with clear political objectives, but for many of
their followers a sufficient motive for belonging to the group is provided by
adherence to the group or a visceral dislike of an ‘enemy’, however defined”
(55).
Finally, there are lone wolf actors who are not formally linked to organized groups and
who operate individually outside of a group-based command structure. These individuals
share an ideological affiliation and act on the basis of that ideology. They may engage in
acts of violence on behalf of an ideological movement but are not directly involved in fur-
thering any particular organization. Spaaij (2010) defines lone wolf terrorism as involving,
“terrorist attacks carried out by persons who (a) operate individually, (b) do not belong to
an organized terrorist group or network, and (c) whose modi operandi are conceived and
directed by the individual without any direct outside command or hierarchy” (856). A
prominent example would be the attacks carried out by Anders Breivik in Norway in July
10
of 2011. However, this definition would exclude Timothy McVeigh’s April 1995 attack on
the Oklahoma Federal buildings because his accomplice Terry Nichols is believed to have
played a large role in the event (Spaaij 2010).
Although there are several distinct organization structures that make up the far right
movement, at the end of the day, their goals are largely aligned. The movement seeks
to alter the status quo through policy changes that represent their ideological imperatives.
Some groups are more extreme than others in the changes they are pursuing but the un-
derlying motivations are broadly the same. The far right exhibits extreme nationalist sen-
timents and pursues the preservation of cultural homogeneity, which naturally manifests
into policy platforms that have a tendency to represent xenophobia, racial exclusionism,
and, of course, opposition to immigration with a strong state to enforce closed borders.
What is of interest in this dissertation are the causes of subsequent violent behavior by the
extreme right as a tactic of policy change. To identify these causes, beyond defining the
ideological motivations of the extreme-right as well as the various organizational forms
that the movement takes, it is also necessary to distinguish among the forms of violence
attributed to the far right.
1.2 Defining Extreme-Right Terrorism
Over 25 years ago Schmid and Jongman (1988) identified roughly 100 formal defi-
nitions of terrorism. One might expect the more narrow classification of ‘extreme-right’
terrorism to be clearly defined with obvious definitional boundaries but this is not the case.
The handful of definitions that do exist are vague and do not adequately describe the con-
cept. To define extreme-right terrorism as it will be used in this dissertation, several points
must be addressed. First, I will make the distinction between transnational and domestic
terrorism to illustrate that extreme-right terrorism is a category of domestic terrorism. Sec-
ond, I will justify the need for making categorical distinctions among types of terrorism
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based on political ideology. Finally, I will differentiate extreme-right terrorism from other
similarly defined acts of violence such as ‘hate crimes’ and ‘extremist crimes.’
In recent years, a major focus in the quantitative study of terrorism has been on em-
pirically distinguishing between transnational and domestic events. This is because the
motivations for attacking one’s own government or population are likely to be systemat-
ically different from the motivations for attacking the government or population outside
of one’s country. Section 2332b of Title 18 of the United States Code defines domestic
terrorism as an activity involving:
“Violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law;
Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii)
to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii)
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.”
(18 U.S.C § 2332b 2014).
The only significant difference between the definition of domestic and transnational
terrorism, according to U.S. Code, is whether the act is occurring primarily within or out-
side of the country in which the attack occurs. I share with Goodwin (2012a) the focus on
“individuals, groups or networks that are (i) inspired by right-wing extremist ideology and
(ii) employ violence and/or terrorism as a tactic through which they pursue various goals”
(44). Extreme-right terrorism is not only a type of domestic terrorism perpetrated exclu-
sively within a country’s territorial jurisdiction, it must also be motivated by an underlying
far-right political ideology. Not all types of domestic terrorism are the same, making it
potentially problematic to attribute a similar causes to all domestic terrorist events. Polit-
ical ideology of the perpetrator(s) is one major dimension on which we can differentiate
among events that have similar causes.
Even within the rational-choice framework there is a greater focus on the ‘end goals’
of terrorism rather than the motivating factors for violence. For example Kydd and Walter
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(2006) identify five potential goals of terrorists: Regime change, territorial change, policy
change, social control, and maintenance of the status quo. Although this speaks to the
sought-after outcome of terrorism, this tells us nothing about how certain motivations may
shape the desire for specific goals and it says nothing about potential exogenous threats to
those motivations that might stimulate violence. We can certainly imagine cases where the
end-goal of a terrorist group is policy change. Though, is there not tremendous variation
in the types of policies that specific groups want to change? If so, what accounts for this
variation? Can we attribute the same cause for each act of terrorism where the goal is to
achieve policy change? I argue that ideological motivation is one way to account for this
variation in end goals and that each ideological motivation has a separate and distinct set
of causes that can be attributed to their associated acts of terrorism.
If part of the ideology driving radical-right terrorist groups involves extreme national-
ism, the preservation of racial purity, and thus opposition to immigration, we might expect
for those who identify with this ideology to see immigration as a threat to their stated goals
and may then be more likely to engage in violence targeting symbols of immigration as
the source of that threat. This is potentially quite a different causal relationship from en-
vironmental terrorists who might attack the crew of a whaling vessel or a fishing industry
executive to stop the legalization of whaling, for example. Both the right-wing terrorists
and the environmental terrorists may be seeking the same broad end goal: policy change.
Their attack might also be classified as domestic terrorism. Yet the stimulus for either
groups engagement in an act of terrorism is likely to be entirely different because their
underlying motivations are different.
There is certainly variation in the motivations among far-right terrorists as well but
their commonalities far surpass their similarities with other ideological categories. Extreme-
right groups are far more similar to one another, with respect to their motivations for vio-
lence, than they are with left-wing or special interest groups, for example. For this reason,
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grouping them in the aggregate category of ’domestic terrorism’ and attributing a single
cause to all domestic terrorist events is potentially problematic. Therefore, if we want to
analyze the causes of terrorism, it will be important to differentiate among subcategories
such as ideological motivation.
Part of the reason why making these categorical distinctions is rarely done is due to
a lack of data availability. Less than a handful of datasets have been published that dif-
ferentiate among ideological subtypes.3 This lack of data availability directly stems from
the difficulty of measuring such a specific concept. Even beyond identifying the location
of an attack and whether it was intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, one
must further determine whether the political motivation derived from a specific space on
the ideological spectrum. These reasons have limited the quantitative work on right-wing
terrorism.
An additional source of contention in the literature on right-wing violence is whether
or not the act of violence committed should be labeled as an act of right-wing terrorism
or a hate crime. The two types of violence exhibit highly similar characteristics. Jenness
and Grattet (2001) define a hate crime as an act “motivated by bias toward individuals or
groups based on particular status characteristics such as race, religion, ancestry, sexual
orientation, or gender” (77), with racial characteristics being most commonly associated
with right-wing sentiment. Krueger and Maleckova (2002) argue that both terrorism and
hate crimes are ‘close cousins’ because, “the target of an offense is selected because of his
or her group identity, not because of his or her individual behavior, and because the effect
of both is to wreak terror on a greater number of people than those directly affected by
violence” (28).
3E.g. Terrorism in Western Europe Events (TWEED) Database (Engene 2007), Domestic Terrorist Vic-
tims (DTV) database, (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2011), and Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in
the United States (PPT-US) database, (Miller and Smarick 2013).
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Although there are clear similarities, right-wing terrorism and racially motivated hate
crimes differ in two key ways. First, perpetrators of hate crimes are not driven by a po-
litical affiliation while perpetrators of terrorism are driven by this. Second, hate crimes
are disproportionately committed by members of the majority mainstream and high-status
population, while acts of terrorism tend to be committed by groups of lower status.
Hate crimes are certainly motivated by biases toward individuals and groups but they
are not motivated by a broader political ideology. Perpetrators of hate crimes are rarely
observed as having strong political affiliations and are not typically associated with orga-
nizations that espouse a particular ideology (Larys and Mares 2011). Hate crimes tend to
be unplanned, spontaneous, and locally-oriented acts of aggression that are not intended
to necessarily broadcast a broader political message. Right-wing terror attacks are also
motivated by biases against individuals and groups but are strategically planned and are
intended to reach a broader audience in order to signal to the government a desire for
policy change (LaFree and Dugan 2004).
Hate crimes and terrorism also differ in the average economic status of the perpetra-
tors who commit the violence. Hate crimes tend to be perpetrated by individuals with
higher economic status while acts of terrorism tend to be committed by those of lower
economic status (Black 2004). This potentially suggests two different causal mechanisms
contributing their prevalence. Deloughery, King and Asal (2012) refer to this distinction
as a“downward offense” (hate crime) versus an “upward crime” (terrorism).
Right-wing terrorism and racially-motivated hate crimes are similar along many di-
mensions. However, I take the perspective that they are two distinct forms of violence and
treat them as such throughout the dissertation. The primary distinction I make is whether
or not the perpetrator intended to signal a broader political message through the act of vio-
lence. In this dissertation I am seeking to determine whether migrant inflows increase the
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likelihood of extreme-right terrorism, not racially motivated hate crimes. The following
section reviews existing arguments on the causes of extreme-right terrorism.
1.3 Existing Arguments
There is an exceedingly large literature addressing the correlates of far right political
party success, anti-immigrant public sentiment, and domestic terrorism in general, though
there is surprisingly little empirical work examining the causes of extreme-right ideolog-
ically motivated terrorism. What moves people from simply supporting an extreme ide-
ology to actually engaging in violence on behalf of an ideological movement? To what
extent does immigration influence extreme-right terrorism? The following literature pro-
vides useful points of departure in answering these questions.
Initial work in social psychology and criminology attempted to identify the psycholog-
ical attributes of right-wing terrorists. For example, Ferracuti and Bruno (1981) identified
nine specific characteristics from a sample of 908 right wing terrorists in Italy. Several
of these attributes included ambivalence toward authority, sexual role uncertainties, and
“magical thinking.” Unfortunately, while there are only a handful of psychological studies
on right-wing terrorists, there is little overlap found in their characteristics and the experi-
mental studies do not include a control group. Therefore, psychological analyses thus far
greatly suffer from both internal and external validity issues, preventing us from conclud-
ing that these characteristics are significantly different from the non-terrorist population
(Victoroff 2005).
However, there are several other promising theoretical avenues. One is a socioeco-
nomic approach or sometimes referred to as the economic interest thesis, which argues
that violent mobilization will occur as a collective response to individual frustrations once
the level of perceived or actual deprivation is sufficiently large. Economically marginal-
ized communities will rationally respond to their repressor with violence (Gurr 1970; Ko-
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rnhauser 1959; Smelser 1963; Turner and Killian 1957). Handler (1990) examined the
socioeconomic characteristics of right and left wing terrorists in the United States utiliz-
ing FBI interview data and found that only 19 percent of right wing terrorists received a
college degree (compared to 67.6 percent for left wing terrorists) and 74.8 percent work
in blue collar occupations (compare to just 24.3 percent of left wing terrorists). Though
these findings might suggest a crude link between vulnerable economic status and ter-
rorism, most macro level multivariate studies addressing the link between socioeconomic
factors and terrorism do not examine right wing terrorism specifically.
A sizable literature does evaluate the potential motivations for engaging in terrorism
ranging from poverty, income inequality, and economic deprivation explanations to the
repression of political freedoms (Abadie 2006; Bloomberg, Hess and Weerapana 2004;
Bloomberg and Hess 2008; Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Krueger and Laitin 2008; Li and
Schaub 2004; Krueger and Malackova 2003; Piazza 2006, 2011). However, these stud-
ies focus exclusively on transnational terrorism, leaving them unable to provide insight
into the motivations for terrorism against one’s own government or population. The vast
majority of studies on the extreme right focus on the connection between socioeconomic
factors and electoral support and not terrorism as an outcome (Kriesi 1999).
A second group of studies focus on growing ethnic heterogeneity to explain anti-
immigrant sentiment. Comparative research as well as work in race and ethnic politics
looks at the connection between foreign minority populations and native anti-immigrant
reactions but does not examine terrorism as an outcome. The dominant theoretical ap-
proach among studies of ethnicity and extreme-right hostility largely within the U.S. and
western European contexts broadly derives from realistic group conflict theory. Origi-
nating in the work of Key (1949) and Blalock (1967), group conflict theory posits that
anti-minority violence will be more prevalent when the size of the minority population is
large. The more popular variant of this theory, known as the power-threat hypothesis sug-
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gests that the intensity of racial intolerance is positively related to the size of the minority
population due to heightened perceptions of economic and political threats to the native
population (Blalock 1967; Tolney, Beck and Massey 1989). Because power, resources,
and collective identities are viewed from a zero-sum perspective, majority populations
will naturally treat out-groups as a competitive threat to maintaining these defining ele-
ments (Barth 1969; Bobo 1988; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Olzak 1992; Quillian 1995;
Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002).
Most often these threats are operationalized using measures of immigration into receiv-
ing states in order to capture shifting demographics as well as measures of unemployment
to capture the potential economic threat posed by the influx of migrants. Several cross-
national studies utilize these macroeconomic variables to evaluate the rising success of far
right nationalist and xenophobic political parties (Carter 2005; Givens 2005; Golder 2003;
Kitschelt 1995; Norris 2005). Golder (2003) argues in what he terms his “ideational” argu-
ment that immigration poses a threat to national identity and culture, of which right-wing
parties have taken advantage and have portrayed mainstream parties as agents of the mul-
ticulturalism that is undermining societal homogeneity. Others have drawn on political
economy models to examine whether perceptions of negative distributional consequences
generate unfavorable public sentiment toward immigration (Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter
2007; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001).
Although no study specifically tests the relationship between immigration and right-
wing terrorism, several studies do evaluate the impact of immigration or growing minority
populations on violent and non-violent crime. Green, Glaser and Rich (1998) found that
anti-minority crimes in the U.S. were most prevalent in majority white locales with high
levels of non-white in-migration. Though, the monthly time-series analysis from 1987
to 1995 showed unemployment as having no significant effect. However, others have
found high levels of unemployment to be a strong predictor of anti-minority crimes in the
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U.K. and Germany, respectively (Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston 2010; Falk, Kuhn and
Zweimuller 2011). Most studies are also limited to individual country analyses (Alber
1994; Falk, Kuhn and Zweimuller 2011; Fougere, Kramarz and Pouget 2009; Krell, Nick-
las and Ostermann 1996; McLaren 1999; Koopmans and Olzak 2004) often leading to
contradictory findings. In a sub-national study of both Great Britain and Germany, Dancy-
gier (2010) finds native violence against immigrants to be more prevalent in locales where
there is overall economic scarcity and high immigrant electoral power. This combination
of factors leads to the perception of immigrants as being a threat to the material welfare of
natives. However, it is unclear whether this increases politically motivated violence.
A third literature utilizes political and discursive opportunity structure approaches. A
political opportunity structure framework emphasizes the role of political elites and insti-
tutions in mobilizing the extreme right by heightening the perceived differences between
the native population and foreign ethnic groups (Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 2011). Koopmans
et al. (2005) argue that individuals are more likely to engage in xenophobic violence when
the political context provides favorable opportunities for the mobilization of this behavior.
In other words, far-right violence might emerge when all other channels to express their
ideological demands are unavailable. In addition, political elites within the far right can
legitimize these opportunity structures by encouraging the perception of minorities as be-
ing a social and economic burden (attributable to immigration) for example, which then
may provide a favorable opportunity to further far-right mobilization.
Following Koopmans and Statham (1999) and Ferree (2003), Koopmans and Olzak
(2004) define a discursive opportunity structure as “the aspects of the public discourse
that determine a message’s chances of diffusion in the public sphere” (202). These aspects
involve the degree to which public claims are visible, exhibit resonance, and are legitimate.
Discourse becomes visible when there are more channels of communications broadcasting
the message. Discourse resonates if it produces reactions by other actors in the public
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sphere, either negative or positive, which allows the message to be reproduced and travel
farther. It is legitimate if the majority of actors support rather than reject these claims.
The authors find that public discourse on right-wing violence can serve as a template for
other extremists wishing to use violence as a tactic, leading to the diffusion of right-wing
violence.
Finally, a relevant literature of growing interest within terrorism scholarship is the role
of spatial diffusion. Several studies provide evidence of a contagion effect among terrorist
attacks (Braithwaite and Li 2007; Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida 1980; Neumayer and
Plu¨mper 2010; Cliff and First 2013). In other words, the occurrence of one terrorist attack
may increase the likelihood of subsequent attacks, independent of other causal factors.
Individuals or groups may emulate previous attacks due to a reduction in inhibitions asso-
ciated with carrying out an attack or by now being provided with a potential framework
for the execution of an attack. Potential terrorists may also be drawn to the media atten-
tion being paid to a previous attack and may therefore attempt to compete for attention to
their own message. Attacks by Theodore Kaczynski (the Unibomber), the series of flight
hijackings following the infamous hijacking attempt of D.B. Cooper in 1971, and many of
the school shootings following the Columbine incident, among countless other examples,
are all thought to be, at least in part, the result of an emulation process (Nacos 2009).
Ultimately, traditional comparative economic grievance arguments are useful in demon-
strating the conditions under which a violent radicalization process can take place, whether
it be in the context of a large-scale rebellion against the state or an individual terrorist at-
tack. Ethnic heterogeneity arguments demonstrate the potential perception of economic
and political threats that can arise due to the interaction of different identity groups. Polit-
ical and discursive opportunity approaches emphasize the role of the state in influencing
group-based behavior by highlighting group differences and by influencing access to infor-
mation in the public sphere. These literatures have investigated the role that immigration
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plays in generating anti-immigrant sentiment as well as how it affects racially-motivated
hate crimes; however, none have specifically examined the extent to which immigration
plays a role in explaining right-wing terrorism. I utilize several components of these ap-
proaches to address this potential relationship. The core of the theoretical argument is
previewed in the following section.
1.4 Argument in Brief
This dissertation develops a theory to explain the prevalence of extreme-right terror-
ism. I argue that both a motive and opportunity combine to serve as conditions for pre-
dicting the likelihood of carrying out an attack in general. However, different groups with
different end goals are likely to have different motives and potentially different opportu-
nity structures allowing for the possibility of engaging in an attack. In the case of attacks
that are inspired by an extreme-right political ideology, I argue that influxes of immigrants
in the host state serve as a motive for violence because immigration embodies a major
threat to the ideological imperative of the extreme-right. However, to act solely on this
motive would likely alienate the movement farther from mainstream society. In order for
the extreme-right to gain any power or influence over social and economic policies, they
must not engage in behavior that might harm their cause. This is unless violence as a
strategy to attain that influence can be justified to a broader audience.
I argue that two opportunity structures serve as justifications for acting on the motive.
The first is a domestic economic opportunity structure. This structure arises when both
the economy is declining and when immigration becomes a salient national issue. These
conditions produce an opportunity for action by creating a context in which immigration
can be linked to a declining economy. This does not necessarily mean that the general
public will begin to actively support violence from the far-right. Rather, it does mean
that the mass public is likely more to recognize that the perpetrators are attempting to
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directly address the economic problem where the state is not, thus becoming more likely
to acquiesce to the violence. These conditions are also likely to lead to larger recruiting
pools by disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations.
The second opportunity structure is one based on the spatial diffusion of terrorism.
This structure arises when extreme-right attacks occur in proximate geographical areas.
Again, we begin with increasing inflows of immigrants serving as a motive for action.
In this case, attacks that occur nearby that are clearly identified as an expression of the
extreme-right ideology can legitimate subsequent attacks, serve as a template for emulat-
ing that behavior, and may also create the perception among the terrorists that the govern-
ment is reaching a tipping point. In other words, one more attack may push the government
into negotiating policy concessions in favor of the extreme-right.
In advancing this argument, I provide a detailed discussion of the behavioral assump-
tions that underlie my expectations and attempt to place this theoretical perspective in the
broader context of the terrorist radicalization literature. I draw on several data sources at
the national and sub-national level including data on right-wing terrorism, extreme-right
populist and neofascist party vote shares, net immigration rates, and national newspapers,
all of which is detailed in the following chapters.
1.5 Plan of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter two, I fully explicate the
theoretical argument. In doing so, I first establish a set of general underlying assumptions
concerning terrorist behavior. I then lay out the likely decision-making process specific to
the extreme-right, given these assumptions, which involves establishing their relationship
to the government and the mass public. Next, I provide an operational definition for the
“motive” to act and discuss how influxes of immigrants into a host country can serve as
this motive for the extreme-right. I then detail both the economic and spatial opportunity
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structures that act as a trigger phase for violence. I argue that the highest probability of an
extreme-right attack is when these two conditions, “motive” and “opportunity,” are present.
This argument builds on the rational explanations of terrorism literature by providing an
opportunity structure explanation for extreme-right ideologically motivated terrorism.
In Chapter three, I provide an overview of right-wing terrorism in Western Europe as
well as the region’s history of immigration. I detail the subsequent rise in public opposition
toward immigration and the proliferation of both extreme-right political parties and violent
organizations. I test the theoretical argument proposed in Chapter two in a cross-national
empirical analysis using a sample of 18 Western European countries from 1970 to 2004.
I utilize measures of extreme-right political party vote-share and national unemployment
rates to capture the economic opportunity structure. The spatial opportunity structure is
captured by a measure of country-level geographic proximity. The sample period begins
just before the termination of Europe’s seasonal guest-worker programs, which produced
a massive wave of permanent migrant communities across the region. Net migration rates
across the sample have been sharply rising ever since.
Chapter four presents an empirical analysis at the level of the administrative region in
England from 1998 to 2005. I first discuss the development of right-wing terrorism along
with the country’s experience with immigration throughout the time-period. Then, rather
than utilizing a measure of extreme-right political party vote-share to represent one part
of the economic opportunity structure potential terrorists face, I opt to use a more fine
grained measure of newspaper coverage of immigration. The spatial opportunity structure
is then captured by a measure of administrative region-level geographic proximity within
England.
Chapter five concludes with a synthesis of the overall findings and the degree to which
the combination of both the cross-national and subnational analyses were able to capture
various elements of the theoretical argument in ways in which only one method would not
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effectively be able to do. I will derive policy implications from the results and discuss the
significance of the findings and how they will contribute to our overall understanding of
extreme-right terrorism and ideologically-motivated violence in general.
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2. THEORY: THE ROLE OF IMMIGRATION IN EXTREME-RIGHT TERRORISM
The labor market effects of the global 1973 oil price shock generated permanent mi-
grant communities across Western Europe. At the same time, the past three decades exhib-
ited dramatic fluctuations in extreme-right terrorism. Is extreme-right terrorism a response
to rising foreign minority populations? If so, then why do countries such as the Nether-
lands and Sweden experience relatively few right-wing terrorist incidents throughout this
time period while Great Britain and France experience a relatively high number when all
four have similar percentages of foreign born populations? This chapter offers an argu-
ment for this puzzle.
The core of the argument in this dissertation is that a right-wing terrorist attack is most
likely to occur when the perpetrator has both a motive and an opportunity to engage in
an attack. These broad conditions are not confined to the case of right-wing terrorism. In
theory, the necessary conditions for nearly all modes of violence, including ideologically
motivated forms of terrorism could be subsumed under the broad categories of “motive”
and “opportunity.” That is, if one intends on changing the status quo for example, one
must have a motive or reason to do so as well as the perception that an act of violence is
justified to obtain that change. What could be perceived as a justification for violence? In
the case of terrorism, the answer will depend on the initial condition: The motive.
Acts of terrorism are often grouped together for purposes of analysis based on particu-
lar characteristics of the group/individual or the attack itself. For example, we group events
based on the spiritual motivation (secular versus religious), willingness to die (suicidal ver-
sus non-suicidal), locale (domestic versus transnational), target of interest (e.g. property or
individuals), and political ideology (e.g. leftist, rightist, special interest) (Victoroff 2005).
We do this in order to establish a common cause for each attack type. Consider the ex-
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ample of an attack on a Japanese whaling vessel versus a bombing outside of an Israeli
embassy. These events are likely to have completely different motivational factors. The
motive for the first event might have been that the Japanese whalers were killing whales
for consumer products. The motive for the second event might have been the imposition
of pro-Israeli propaganda in a largely Islamic neighborhood. The only similarity between
these events is the use of violence as a response to some action. The motivations for the
use of violence are likely to be entirely different. The former could be classified as an
environmental motivation and the latter, a religious motivation. In other words, the perpe-
trators in the first example were motivated by a threat to the environment and in the second
example, by a threat to their religion. Therefore, to group these two events together and to
attribute a common motive would not be appropriate.
If we are to classify a right-wing terrorist attack as an act of violence that is motivated
by an extreme-right political ideology, then a motivating factor for an act of right-wing
terrorism should in some way threaten the extreme-right ideology. As I established in
the introductory chapter, immigration poses a significant threat to the ideological move-
ment. It does so by threatening the culturally-based nativist sentiments in the push for
nationalism as well as through national economic integration. Influxes of immigrants (the
embodiment of these threats) into the state should therefore present an obvious threat to
the extreme-right ideology, ultimately providing a clear motive for action.
Although the motive is a necessary condition, it may not be sufficient for action. The
highest probability of an attack should occur when there is both a motive and an oppor-
tunity to act, though this does not prelude the possibility of attacks occurring when an
opportunity structure does not arise. Attacks are simply less likely to occur without the
presence of both conditions. I define “opportunity” as a context in which the perpetrator
perceives an act of terrorism as being a legitimate response in order to either ameliorate
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or symbolize opposition to the threat.1 I argue that there are two potential sources of op-
portunity: (1) A domestic economic opportunity structure and (2) a spatial opportunity
structure. Figure 2.1 presents an outline of the theoretical framework. I argue that an
influx of immigrants by itself is inherently defined as a threat to the ideological goals of
the extreme-right and thus provides a motive for action. However, the decision to act on
this motive has a higher likelihood of being triggered by either an economically derived
opportunity or a spatially derived opportunity.2
An economic opportunity structure arises when (1) domestic economic conditions are
declining and (2) when immigration becomes a nationally salient policy issue. The first
condition is similar to the economic competition argument popular in comparative race
and ethnic studies where native populations are more likely to view immigrants as a com-
petitive threat to finite economic resources when the economy is declining (Barth 1969;
Bobo 1988; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Olzak 1992; Quillian 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts
and Coenders 2002). The second condition is similar to Political Opportunity Structure ap-
proaches where the perception of threat is often determined by the political context, which
is shaped by political elites and institutions (Kitschelt 1986; Koopmans et al. 2005; Tarrow
1My definition of “opportunity,” though similar, is not the conventional definition used in the broader
conflict literature. The conventional definition of an opportunity structure is a situation in which the costs and
constraints of violence are reduced, either by a state’s reduced capacity for repression, the degree of openness
of a state’s political institutions, the degree of stability of elite alignments within the state in relation to the
broader social movement, and whether their is a presence of elite allies (McAdam 1996). My definition
does share the notion of a perceived reduction in the costs and/or constraints of violence but also includes
an element of legitimacy. Being in a marginalized position, terrorist groups often engage in violence as a
strategy to delegitimize the current government and gain public support. With more public support, terrorist
groups may perceive less of a societal backlash for their actions, which can also be interpreted as a reduction
on constraints. An opportunity arises when potential terrorists perceives an opening in the ability to carry
out an attack that the terrorist perceives will be more broadly viewed as a legitimate action. Perhaps a more
appropriate term for this condition is a “legitimizing opportunity.”
2It is important to note that this theoretical framework is generally only applicable to liberal democratic
states. According to the theory, the motive for violence is specified as a positive influx of net immigrants
(measured as permanent residents). If a state does not regularly accept the in-migration of permanent res-
idents, then in theory, the motive will not exist for violence. Almost by definition, non-liberal states have
extreme limits on citizenship and permanent residence. Therefore, my theory would not apply to non-liberal
states.
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2011). The degree of salience of a political issue can alter the degree to which natives will
attribute blame to migrants for a declining economy. These conditions ultimately combine
to create an opportunity for action because a greater proportion of the mass public will be-
come aware of and perceive immigration to be a realistic threat to the economic livelihood
of the country, not just a threat to those who hold extreme-right sentiments. The salience
of immigration as a major policy issue should condition the extent to which this perception
exists.
This does not necessarily mean that the mass public will begin to support far-right
violent tactics, but it does mean that these conditions will help to bridge the ideological gap
that exists between the far right and the mass public in terms of perceiving immigration
as generating high economic costs. It also means that there will be greater recognition
among the mass public that the far-right movement is attempting to directly address the
economic problems where the state is not. In addition, these conditions will increase
the potential recruitment pool and ideological sympathy for right-wing terror groups by
disproportionately affecting economically vulnerable populations.
A spatial opportunity structure arises when right-wing attacks occur in proximate ge-
ographical areas. This condition creates an opportunity for action for several reasons. Not
only does a nearby attack itself legitimize a subsequent attack but also now the current per-
petrators have a template for how to engage in a successful attack, allowing emulation to
occur. In addition, engaging in an attack following a previous attack that occurred nearby
may create a tipping point (perceived by the terrorists) where the government will provide
policy concessions changing the status quo in favor of the terrorists.
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Figure 2.1: Theoretical Framework
Therefore, to understand the incidence of extreme-right terrorism it is necessary to
review the ideological goals of the extreme-right and how and why immigration generates
a perceived threat to these goals, creating a motive for action. This framework will then
allow for the possibility of deriving formal expectations concerning the extent to which
immigrant does and does not lead to a higher probability of right-wing terrorism.
2.1 Immigration as a Motive
In order to decompose the potential relationship between migrant inflows and extreme-
right terrorism, I make several assumptions. First, for inter-group conflict to exist there
must be a perception of incompatible group goals (Bar-Tal, Kruglanski and Klar 1989;
Pruitt and Rubin 1986). Second, the perception of a significant threat to these group goals
must precede each conflict (Allport 1954; Barth 1969; Bobo 1988; Bobo and Hutchings
1996). However, threat perceptions can lead to a variety of conflict intensities, ranging
from those that are simply non-violent hostile relations to more organized lethal confronta-
tions. Third, following the rationalist explanations of terrorism literature, (Crenshaw 1981,
2001; Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003, 2005) I assume that terrorist organizations ex-
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ist and act strategically to ultimately gain political and social control over the region in
which they reside. This implies that extreme-right terror groups want to move from their
categorization as an “extreme” movement to being recognized a mainstream movement
with their political and social ideology driving state and cultural affairs. Finally, I assume
a clear asymmetric power struggle between the terror groups and the government. This
asymmetry is what leads these fringe organizations to engage in the tactic of terrorism,
rather than some larger-scale guerilla warfare. However, those committing attacks may
not necessarily be full-fledged members of an organization but simply associate with and
follow the ideological movement.
I argue that the likelihood of a terror event can be determined by a combination of two
factors. First we must identify the motive. Second, we must identify the opportunity or
the condition that triggers one to act on the motive. These two factors on which I build
my argument, in part, draw on work from social psychology that examines the role of
situational cues on the likelihood of aggression. In this work, environmental cues prime
individuals already experiencing frustrating conditions by activating aggression-related
thoughts and behaviors (Anderson and Huesmann 2003; Bushman and Huesmann 2006).3
For example, Turner, Layton and Simmons (1975) developed a field experiment in
which they positioned a pick-up truck at traffic lights and waited 12 seconds after the light
turned green to respond. The treatment condition involved equipping the truck with a
gun rack containing a military rifle while the control condition contained nothing. Other
drivers were significantly more likely to honk at the truck in the treatment condition than
in the control condition. This example demonstrates how aggressive behavior may not
simply derive from frustrating circumstances but can be triggered by environmental cues
while experiencing the frustration.
3For an extensive review see Engelhardt and Bartholow (2013).
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My argument also derives, in part, from the radicalization process described by Kruglan-
ski et al. (2014). The authors argue that violent extremism is likely to emerge when (1)
a goal of significance is activated, (2) when terrorism is identified as a means to achieve
significance, and (3) when the goal of significance dominates over other motivational fac-
tors. It is a quest for personal or group significance that can provide the motive for violent
extremism. The act of terrorism is then seen as an opportunity to regain significance.
Kruglanski et al. (2014, 73) define the concept of “significance” as “the fundamen-
tal desire to matter, to be someone, [and] to have respect.” One way to activate the goal
or quest for significance is through a loss of significance. In fact, the authors claim that
a “Mere threat of significance loss can motivate actions intended to prevent it” (75). In
the case of right-wing terrorism, a motive for violence can be generated when there is a
threat to the goals of the ideology. The ideology signifies the reason for the movement’s
existence. Therefore any threat to the ideology will represent a potential loss of the move-
ment’s significance and will generate a motive to prevent or regain that loss.
This perceived loss of significance may occur on both an individual and group level.
An individual may perceive significance loss under unstable economic, social, or political
conditions occurring in a state. Kruglanski et al. (2014) argue that, “Such conditions
could introduce a state of anomie (Durkheim 1893), in the sense that the state is failing
to provide the means for its citizens to attain their goals. This could foster a feeling of
helplessness and personal insignificance, arousing a significance quest potentially taken
advantage of by a terrorist movement.” Those who hold extreme-right ideological views,
even if not formally affiliated with an extreme-right organization, may be more prone to
interpreting these conditions as a loss of personal significance and attribute the instability
to immigration.
Groups of individuals are likely to perceive a loss of significance related to their social
identity. Political organizations, grassroots social movements, and other group networks
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holding extreme-right ideological beliefs share a social identity that is rooted in nation-
hood. The incorporation of other ethnic groups, particularly as a consequence of open
democratic ideals should then clearly present a threat to the ideological mission of the
extreme-right by inducing the perception of a loss of significance to their social identity.
Influxes of non-native immigrants directly confront the goal of preserving racial homo-
geneity. It suppresses the push for national superiority by incorporating those of other
nationalities and potentially pushes the state to provide benefits to non-natives at the ex-
pense of the native population. When the state allows migrants to live, work, and poten-
tially become citizens, this directly contradicts their stated goals. The government may
then be seen as non-responsive to the far right pressure for policy change. This further
reduces their ability to influence the social culture in their favor. For these reasons, the
extreme-right should rationally view immigration as a threat to their ideological mission.
The state, however, must engage in economic integration to achieve overall economic
gains. Because of this, economically open states face a “liberal paradox” specific to im-
migration, which has developed out of fundamental changes to what defines not only the
modern nation-state but also the modern liberal state. That is, the development of a com-
mitment to equal citizenship and a move toward a more cosmopolitan ideology of cultural
incorporation (Miller 2008). In other words, “The modern democratic state is exposed to
contradictory pressures in its treatment of immigrants: the normative force of human rights
combines with the economic demand for immigrants with particular skills to push states
toward an open door policy, while the higher costs of receiving immigrants and the costs
of admission to full citizenship, together with the costs of full integration push in the op-
posite direction, towards a highly selective and restrictive admissions policy” (377). This
forces the state to have to justify the refusal of entry while simultaneously encouraging
in-migration and cultural integration.
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This contradictory institutional process then provides a justification for the general
public to both support and oppose immigration. If the economy is doing well, individuals
will be more likely to support immigrant incorporation because they will not be linked
to negative economic externalities. In fact, they will likely be seen as contributing to the
thriving economy. However, if the economy is declining, the public will be more likely
to oppose immigration, attributing blame to the immigrants as being a costly fiscal burden
(Card and Preston 2009; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Gang and Yun 2002; Mayda 2006;
Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky 2006).
Because radical-right groups ideologically oppose immigration for xenophobic, na-
tionalistic, and social reasons beyond macroeconomic concerns, they use this contradictory
institutional process to their advantage by establishing in-group/out-group distinctions. If
the state confers equal rights and privileges onto immigrants (even with full citizenship)
and/or non-citizens to that of the current citizenry then the meaning of citizenship in and
of itself is called into question. What makes citizenship meaningful suddenly diminishes
because one can gain all of the same rights without being a citizen or simply become a
citizen by crossing borders. In other words, the far right does not depend on negative eco-
nomic conditions to justify their opposition to immigration but the general public does.
Therefore, it would be difficult for the extreme-right to justify an act of terrorism against
an immigrant without the recognized presence of a declining economy. Doing so would
only further alienate the group from mainstream society and further prevent their goals of
policy change and social control.
This ultimately suggests that immigration generates a threat among those who hold
extreme-right political views through a perceived loss of individual and/or group signifi-
cance. An increased presence of foreign minority populations who bring different cultures,
religious beliefs, languages, and who sometimes have strikingly different phenotypic ap-
pearances creates a perception that the traditional culture of the host country is dimin-
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ishing. This is particularly threatening to the far right over others along the ideological
spectrum because of the weight they place on the preservation of national identity. This
threat then creates a motive to regain that significance. However, what is needed to re-
trieve that diminishing sense of identity (terrorism) beyond simply having a motive is an
opportunity that will better justify acting on this motive through violence.
The following sections detail two different opportunity structures. Each provides a
specific set of conditions that represent a trigger to acting on the motive. In other words,
immigration is a necessary but perhaps insufficient element in explaining extreme-right
terrorism. The likelihood of carrying out an attack (or acting on the threat of immigration)
is conditioned by a set of opportunities that increase the broader perception that an attack
is justified.
2.2 Economic Opportunity Structure
I argue that two features of a country’s domestic environment combine to create an
“economic opportunity” structure. This structure represents the trigger or stimulus pro-
viding the justification for terrorism. This structure arises when the economy is declining
and when immigration becomes an increasingly salient national policy issue. Figure 2.1
illustrated the overall theoretical framework, which suggested that there exist two phases
in the terrorists’ decision-making process. First is to identity a motive for action. Sec-
ond, in order to justify terrorism as a response to this motive, there must be a space of
relative opportunity identified by the potential terrorists. Figure 2.2 below illustrates the
components of the economic opportunity framework.
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Figure 2.2: Unemployment and Immigration Salience as an Opportunity Structure
As demonstrated in the previous sections, immigration serves as a motive for violence
for the far-right. However, this motive is based cultural and nationalist sentiments, not
necessarily on economic concerns. These reasons are not legitimate means for opposing
immigration in the eyes of the general public, which is is why those who hold these sen-
timents are described as the “extreme” right. These sentiments exist on the fringe of the
ideological spectrum. Although the threat of immigration to sustaining traditional cultural
valued may be perceived as real and serious to those who hold these sentiments, it would
not be rational to act on that threat if immigration is not, at least to some degree, also
perceived as a real and serious threat by the general public. Acting on this threat with-
out widespread acknowledgement that immigration may, in fact, be threatening among the
mass public would further jeopardize the goals of the extreme-right, continue to push them
into the ideological fringe of society, and would be inimical to their political goals.
2.2.1 The Role of Unemployment
Observing rising unemployment levels can produce an opportunity for action by cre-
ating a context in which immigration is linked to a declining economy. In other words,
immigrants can more easily be utilized as a ‘scapegoat’ for producing negative economic
conditions. In this way, the public will be more likely to perceive immigration as a cause of
rising unemployment without sharing the sentiment that immigrants are deteriorating the
national culture. This does not necessarily mean the public will have a greater tolerance
for violence. It means that the public is more likely to recognize the potential perpetra-
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tors as attempting to directly address the economic problem. Rising unemployment is
also likely to lead to a greater recruitment pool. Vulnerable populations who have been
affected by unemployment will be more likely than other segments of the population to
be tempted to join extreme-right movements because of the potential for sustaining their
economic livelihood as well as the sense of stability that can come with group membership
and additional network connections.
For example, the Golden Dawn in Greece, which is both a formally recognized polit-
ical party as well as a broader ideological movement, regularly hosts soup kitchens and
provides basic education for Greeks only throughout the country. With a 27 percent na-
tional unemployment rate, large segments of the population have taken advantage of the
movement’s help. Such large-scale support resulting in Golden Dawn securing 18 out of
300 seat in parliament in the 2012 Greek elections (Fairclough 2012).
In order for migrant inflows to be increasingly viewed as a realistic threat among the
general public, there must exist tangible evidence to validate the claim. Rising unem-
ployment can serve as a clear source of evidence. An influx of large endowments of low
skilled labor relative to other factors, will to some degree, drive down the wages of na-
tive low skilled workers (Borjas 1999; Borjas, Freeman and Katz 1996, 1997). As Hiscox
and Hainmueller (2010) point out, this effect should reverse where there exist inflows of
highly skilled immigrants, driving up wages for low skilled natives and reducing returns
for highly skilled natives. This suggests that native workers should oppose immigrants
with skill levels similar to their own. However, there is contradictory empirical evidence
for these claims. Some studies do report negative wage and employment effects as a result
of low skilled immigration (Borjas 1999; Borjas, Freeman and Katz 1996, 1997), while
others find minimal if any support (Card 2001, 2007; Lewis 2005). Historically, the ma-
jority of migrants to Western Europe were low-skilled and continue to fill the majority of
low-skilled labor occupations. However, there is still a reasonable amount of variation in
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the skills of immigrants as well as the skills of natives. Because of this, there will always
be some group at any given time that can legitimately link migrant inflows as generating a
potential economic burden, unless migrant flows are halted altogether. Rising unemploy-
ment may then increase the general perception of job vulnerability when there are influxes
in migrants, which may create an environment where anti-immigrant ideology becomes
more reasonable and acceptable.
Therefore, larger influxes of migrants along with rising unemployment should generate
the perception of a more realistic and direct threat to the mass public because there is
tangible macroeconomic evidence validating the claim that migration produces negative
externalities, of which the broader public is more likely to be aware. Members of the
far right may then utilize this evidence as a more reasonable argument to justify their
opposition to immigration, rather than drawing on racial or cultural claims. The mass
public is then more likely to accept evidence-based economic claims and tolerate the stance
of the far right, moving them slightly closer to the moderate or mainstream positions.
2.2.2 Immigration as a Salient Policy Issue
In the early 1980s Jean-Marie Le Pen, former leader of the French National Front
infamously expressed the far-right party’s stance on immigration, “Two million unem-
ployed...that’s two million immigrants too many” (Gunn 1989). This slogan was highly
effective in making the National Front one of the most successful extreme-right political
parties in the history of Western European politics. The key was not only directly blam-
ing immigrants for the country’s economic woes of the past decade, it was also the act of
bringing immigration as a public policy issue into the political sphere as national priority.
Linking immigration to unemployment, although a potentially real connection, may
not matter to the native population if the media and political elite do not recognize im-
migration as a national policy issue. Huysmans (2000) argues, “The political process of
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connecting migration to criminal and terrorist abuses of the internal market does not take
place in isolation. It is related to a wider politicization in which immigrants and asylum-
seekers are portrayed as a challenge to the protection of national identity and welfare pro-
visions” (751) Since the ending of the guest-worker programs after 1973, extreme-right
leaning populist and neo-fascist parties increasingly took on ant-immigration platforms
and are often cited in the media for linking unemployment with immigration and blaming
foreigners for declining economic conditions. Green, Glaser and Rich (1998) argue that
the public perception of threat may depend on whether these frustrations are made salient
and are justified by political elites. Green, McFalls and Smith (2001) and Green and Seher
(2003) specifically point out the lack of research investigating the ways in which political
elites and organizations frame and subsequently mobilize societal actions. Although occa-
sionally alluded to, little quantitative scholarship in political science directly addresses the
potentially important role that the diffusion of information plays in contributing to conflict
outcomes. Even less work exists in the field of terrorism studies.
A 2006 Annual Hate Crime Report from the Office Democratic Institutions and Hu-
man rights (ODIHR) stated, “Increasingly in many states, hate-motivated discourse serves
to dehumanize individuals, perpetuate stereotypes, and create a climate in which racist
violence may flourish.” In a 2005 meeting of the European Commission against Racism
and Intolerance it was stated that, “Electoral campaigns in which political leaders exploit
the xenophobic fears and latent racism of the electorate through speeches or slogans pro-
vide the backdrop to racist violence. When government officials at any level engage in
racist speech, their statements have greater potential to do harm.” Political elites are not
only able to reinforce the connection between immigration and unemployment, they can
also enable acts of violence by providing those who associate with an extreme ideology a
justification to address the threat.
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To take Rogers Brubaker’s phrasing in reference to nationalist rhetoric, “The force,
meaning, and resonance” of immigration-based rhetoric “like that of any other form of
rhetoric, depend not on the rhetoric itself, or on the intentions of the speaker, but on the
schemas through which the rhetoric is interpreted” (Brubaker 2012). In this way, discourse
gives meaning to and plays an important role in defining how we interpret objective reality.
It brings about, regulates, and legitimates our understandings of the social world and thus
plays a particularly influential role in social phenomena such as perceptions of threat.
However, it is not necessarily only negative discourse that can influence the actions
taken by extreme-right groups (or other types of groups), it is the act of bringing the issue
at hand into the public sphere where it was previously absent or perceived as less relevant.
Koopmans and Olzak (2004) argue that, “The public visibility and resonance of violence
against a particular target group may increase because the position of this group is hotly
debated in the pubic discourse. As a result, the diffusion chances of violence against the
target will improve, even if nobody in the public debate refers to the target group by taking
an explicitly negative stand.” In other words, publicly addressing immigration as a feature
of current public policy, even without taking a positive or negative stand, introduces the
issue into the public sphere as a topic worth evaluating. Groups or individuals that oppose
or are in favor of the issue are now both provided a space to detail their arguments to
the broader public through whatever mediums they choose. These positions experience
further rebuttals and eventually become apart of the salient political policy space. Those
who favor immigration now have a set of arguments and justifications for their position.
Just the same, those who oppose immigration are now able to draw on arguments and
evidence against immigration, which can further mobilize or trigger actions in response to
a motive.
If one recognizes immigration as a direct threat to one’s ideological goals, perceives
a greater proportion of the mass public as being increasingly economically threatened by
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the rising presence of immigrants, and perceives the state as legitimating this sentiment,
then the motivation and opportunity for violent retaliation from the far right faces fewer
obstacles. The motivation will always exist as long as there continues to be inflows of
migrants because the ideological imperative of the far right is to achieve an authoritarian
state inhabited only by the native population. However, one is unlikely to act only on
this motivation because it would risk further alienation and decreased sustainability of
the ideological movement due to societal and state backlash. When unemployment is
high, there is a higher likelihood that a greater proportion of the mass public will blame
migration as the source of unemployment.
This makes the anti-immigrant appeals by the far right appear less extreme potentially
leading to greater acquiescence for the movement’s acivities while also increasing the po-
tential recruitment pool due to fewer job prospects. When political elites also legitimize
intolerance against immigrants, this creates the perception of support from the state, on
behalf of which they believe they are acting and lessens the fear of legal backlash for vio-
lent actions. I therefore derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Positive influxes of net migration will lead to a greater likelihood of extreme-
right terrorism as unemployment and immigration issue salience are rising.
2.3 Spatial Opportunity Structure
There is growing and increasingly compelling evidence that numerous forms of violent
conflict are not independent isolated phenomena. Rather, they exhibit non-random spatial
distribution patterns suggesting a high degree of interdependence. In other words, different
types of conflict behaviors, particularly at the sub-state level appear to have the potential to
spread across state boundaries and act as a form of contagion. The vast majority of conflict
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contagion analyses specifically examine large-scale domestic armed conflicts and civil
wars (Anselin and O’Loughlin 1992; Braithwaite 2006, 2010; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008;
Gleditsch 2002; Maves and Braithwaite 2013; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). However,
evidence also exists for the spread of protests and rioting behavior (Govea and West 1981;
Stuart Hill and Cameron 1998; Hill and Rothchild 1986; Myers 2000), anti-government
violence (Garcia and Wimpy Forthcoming), as well as international terrorism (Braithwaite
and Li 2007; Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida 1980; Neumayer and Plu¨mper 2010; Cliff
and First 2013).
Figure 2.3: Spatial Diffusion as an Opportunity Structure
Beyond the state of the domestic economy and immigration issue salience, a second set
of conditions may also facilitate a higher likelihood of extreme-right terrorism. As Figure
2.3 above illustrates, I begin with positive influxes of immigrants serving as the motive for
violence just as with the economic opportunity structure argument. However, in this case
I argue that an opportunity structure arises when right-wing attacks occur in geographi-
cally proximate areas. Because potential perpetrators already have a motive for violence,
observing attacks nearby may (1) provide a template allowing emulation to more easily
occur and (2) provide a tipping point (perceived by the terrorists) in which the government
will be more likely provide policy concessions. In this way, extreme-right terrorism oc-
curring in one spatial unit may be, in part, a function of extreme-right terrorism occurring
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in proximate spatial units if there exist positive influxes of immigrants in those units. I
elaborate on this spatial opportunity structure through a cognitive heuristics framework.
The majority of work on the spread of conflict outcomes uses one of two mechanisms.
The first mechanism relies on a purely rational learning framework in which actors engage
in a strict cost-benefit analysis in their decision on whether or not to use violence.4 Actors
are first exposed to information about events in nearby areas. They are then assumed
to process this information in an unbiased and objective manner, which is then used in
ordering their preferences over a set of potential outcomes. Actors then maximize their
utility by engaging in actions that represent their preference order. In the case of civil war,
actors observe successful rebellions in neighboring countries and emulate those actions to
achieve a similar outcome at home (Lake and Rothchild 1998)
A second mechanism argues that neighboring conflicts may create a large cross-border
migration of refugee populations, which could intensify resource competition and poten-
tially shift the balance of power among competing ethnic groups in receiving countries
(Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Gleditsch 2007; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Sudden
shifts in the distribution of resources might intensify already existing frustrations and lead
to a higher likelihood of rebellion (Gurr 1993). In addition, refugees can act as a conduit of
information concerning conflicts from which they were displaced, revealing new choices
of action for potential rebel groups, leading to subsequent spillover effects (Buhaug and
Gleditsch 2008; Moore and Davis 1998).
This latter mechanism should not apply in this case since one would not expect right-
wing terrorism to produce large-scale displaced refugee population. This should only
apply to mass rebellions and other forms of high intensity intra-state conflicts. In addition,
a rational learning approach may also be inappropriate in this case because it leaves two
4Mechanisms based on emulation largely derive from the policy diffusion literature. For several promi-
nent examples of rational learning in policy diffusion see Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006).
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features of diffusion unanswered. First, the rational learning framework would argue that
terrorism must be successful for others to emulate it. If terrorism is observed as being
an unsuccessful strategy in influencing policy change, then this would not be a preferred
strategy to emulate. However, we rarely witness acts of terrorism leading to significant
policy concessions, yet we observe little change in the rate of occurrence. A rational
learning approach also suggests that actors seek to maximize their utility over outcomes
by searching all available information that might influence the decision making process,
rather than only the set of actions used by potentially unrelated terrorist groups in nearby
spatial units. A cognitive heuristics approach addressed these deficiencies.
In explaining the diffusion of pension reform across Latin America, Weyland (2005,
271) states, “A bold innovation attracts disproportionate attention from neighboring coun-
tries; it is then widely adopted on the basis of its apparent promise, not its demonstrated
success...Thus, the cognitive heuristics framework argues that diffusion is shaped by the
inferential shortcuts of bounded rationality.” Two principle inferential shortcuts–“availability”
and “representativeness”–help to explain the diffusion of right-wing attacks through emu-
lation and the perception of a government tipping process.
The availability heuristic is the tendency for people to overemphasize the significance
of immediately available information, especially in situations of uncertainty. This ten-
dency is also correlated with the perceived magnitude of the consequences of this infor-
mation (Daniel Kahneman and Tversky 1982). Actors will be disproportionately influ-
enced by attention-grabbing events and will be less likely to draw on events perceived to
produce consequences of lesser magnitude. This also means that actors are likely to be
disproportionately influenced by events that occur nearby compared to events that occur
farther away.
Extreme-right organizations, whether formal or informal, at the leadership level, and
especially at the peripheral level generally perceive immigrants to be a threat. However,
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these groups and individuals are constrained to act on the motive provided by the perceived
threat in that they do not want their actions to generate further marginalization of their
ideological cause. A right-wing terrorist attack nearby can lead to the perception that
their ideological movement is powerful and has influence over the shared perception of
threat. It suggests that other groups and individuals (who may not have any direct personal
affiliation with the current group witnessing the attack) who share the ideology and thus the
perceived threat of immigration and who are doing something about the threat. Not only
does this provide a template for emulation but it also legitimizes further similar attacks
(in the eyes of the terrorists) by signaling that an attack can be wielded as a means for
ameliorating some shared threat.
The representativeness heuristic is the tendency to draw excessively confident infer-
ences from observations that may not represent the true population of cases (Daniel Kah-
neman and Tversky 1982). A right-wing terrorist attack in and of itself may be perceived
as a sign of success for the movement even if it does not ultimately achieve policy change.
This may create a perceived opportunity for potential perpetrators because they are likely
to overestimate the probability of success for their own attack. This is likely to create the
perception that the government is facing a tipping point, where experiencing one more
attack might force them into making policy concessions. This perception will make the
potential perpetrators more likely to emulate an attack. This therefore leads to the second
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Positive influxes of net migration will lead to a greater likelihood of extreme-
right terrorism as attacks in geographically proximate areas increase.
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3. CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF WESTERN EUROPE
This chapter tests the theoretical claims made in chapter two in a cross-national sam-
ple of 18 Western European countries. I begin by presenting an overview of the general
patterns of international migration and incidents of extreme-right terrorism in the region.
Next, I detail the empirical research design, the variables used, their measurements, and
the statistical analyses. Finally, I present a discussion of the results and their substantive
effects.
3.1 Patterns of Immigration and Extreme-Right Terrorism in Western Europe
The end of World War II marked a clear shift away from emigration toward several
massive waves of immigration in Western Europe, largely driven by growing economic
opportunities associated with rapid industrial expansion, along with the dissolution of Eu-
ropean colonial empires. For example, during the Algerian War of Independence, France
experienced enormous inflows of former french residents. The Netherlands gained mi-
grants from Indonesia and numerous South-east asian countries post-occupation. By 1990
there were roughly 930,000 foreign nationals working in Great Britain, the majority of
which were of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi descent. To meet the growing domes-
tic labor market demand, most West European states began to actively recruit temporary
workers from former colonies and other overseas territories on a seasonal basis, resulting
in the “guestworker” era of immigration politics in Western Europe (Fassmann and Munz
1992).
Seasonal migration produced benefits for both the sender and host countries. Migrants
could generate far higher wages than was often available in their home countries, which
they could then either send or bring back with them during the off-season. The state pro-
viding the temporary labor opportunity benefited from the lower cost of foreign labor,
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which far-right political parties initially supported. However, in reaction to the 1973 oil
price shock, which generated a widespread economic recession and reduced market ca-
pacity to absorb labor, European governments immediately dissolved their guestworker
programs and began to impose tighter labor restrictions on the recruitment of foreign labor
and immigration in general (Pettigrew 1998). However, these tighter restrictions unex-
pectedly resulted in migrants taking up permanent residence since seasonal returns were
unlikely to be a future option. Conditional agreements allowed for the reuniting of family
members as well as the entry of refugees, which along with the decline of native birth
rates across the region, resulted in an overall increase in net migration throughout the sub-
sequent decades. Naturally, unemployment intensified and foreign minorities were the first
to be blamed.
Economically open governments realize the potential benefits from population inflows
(Borjas 1994, 1995). Migrant inflows increase domestic labor supply, which raises gross
domestic product and thus economic growth. However, an influx of relatively less expen-
sive labor drives wages downward in labor intensive sectors resulting in a redistribution
of income away from more expensive domestic workers to cheaper migrant workers and
capital owners. This laissez-faire treatment of international factor flows, pushed forth by
the neoliberal logic of the contemporary trading state is, of course, the optimal strategy
for the nation as a whole in economic market terms (Bhagwati 1998). However, all eco-
nomically efficient strategies bring about winners and losers, which creates potential for
political conflict among economic actors. Extreme right-wing parties, realizing that they
could take advantage of the economically affected segments of the population (blue collar
and labor-intensive workers), took an anti-immigration platform, blaming foreigners for
unemployment and economic disenfranchisement (Pettigrew 1998). This behavior of the
extreme-right largely led to the rise in anti-foreigner sentiment in European states (Semy-
onov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky 2006).
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Figure 3.1: Net Migration and Extreme-Right Terrorist Attacks Across 18 Western Euro-
pean Countries, 1970 to 2004.
Figure 3.1 presents the trends in total net migration as well as the total yearly number
right-wing terrorist incidences in Western Europe from 1970 to 2004. It is clear that post-
1973 there was a surge in net migration to Western Europe, which can be attributed to the
reaction of permanent settlement by the foreign minorities with the ending of guest-worker
programs. Although of course one cannot make any immediate inferences, the trend of
right-wing terrorist attacks appear to follow a roughly similar pattern to the overall mi-
gration trends. The question of interest is whether or not or to what extent international
migration influences extreme-right terrorism. The previous chapter laid out both an eco-
nomic opportunity and spatial opportunity argument to explain the potential connection.
The rest of this chapter presents an empirical test of these arguments.
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3.2 Research Design and Method
To estimate the effect of migrant inflows on right-wing terrorism this study utilizes a
time-series cross-sectional data structure covering 18 Western European countries from
1970 to 2004.1 The unit of analysis is country-year. Due to the nature of the count out-
come, I employ standard negative binomial regression with robust standard errors clus-
tered over countries.2 The estimation sample used is smaller than the full size of the data
available for both dependent variables due to temporal limitations in several explanatory
variables.
3.3 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the count of extreme-right ideologically motivated domestic
terrorist attacks in a given country-year. Only two datasets provide an ideological catego-
rization of domestic attacks throughout this time period and country sample: The Terror-
ism in Western Europe Events Database (TWEED), complied by Jan Oskar Engene and
the Domestic Terrorist Victims (DTV) Dataset, compiled by Luis de la Calle and Ignacio
Sa´nchez-Cuenca.3 I use measures of extreme-right attacks from both datasets in the main
1These countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United King-
dom.
2The data are highly dispersed with roughly 12% of country-years experiencing at least one right-wing
attack. The likelihood ratio test of alpha = 0 indicates that a zero-inflated negative binomial model is pre-
ferred to the zero-inflated poisson, however, the Vuong test statistic does not necessarily suggest this to be
an improvement over the standard negative binomial (z = 1.29, p = .099).
3See Engene (2006, 2007) and De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2009, 2011) for detailed dataset descrip-
tions. Four other datasets of which I am aware do provide ideological distinctions but are not useful for this
analysis because they either focus exclusively on terror within the United States, provide information only at
the level of the group, not the event, or the database is not currently released for use. These datasets include
the Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United States (PPT-US) Database, complied by Miller and
Smarick (2013), The American Terrorism Study’s Operation and Structure of Right Wing Extremist Groups
in the U.S., 1980 to 2007, complied by Simi (2010), the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), complied by
Freilich et al. (2014), and Arie Perliger’s original collection of U.S. far-right event level data. See Perliger
(Forthcoming) and Perliger (2013).
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analyses following this section. Several features determining the selection of cases for the
variable of interest significantly differ between datasets, which I discuss below.
TWEED defines terrorism as “an act that has inflicted personal injury, or attacks
against material targets (property) if the act is of a nature that could have led to personal
injury or in another way would have a noticeable impact on an audience, while at the
same time the act was committed to direct demands or raise attention from others than
those immediately inflicted with personal or material injury” (Engene 2006, 5). The unit
of analysis is the event-year. I model domestic rather than international terrorism due to
the theoretical expectation that right-wing attacks are occurring as a response by members
of the domestic population. TWEED distinguishes domestic from international terrorism
only by the nationality of the acting group carrying out an attack within their own polit-
ical system and does not consider the nationality of the victim. Specific actions that are
counted as terrorist attacks include bombings, arson, rocket attacks, killings, attempted
killings, abductions, shootings, and sieges. The domestic terrorism data also include at-
tacks carried out by both formal organizations and individuals.
The DTV dataset shares the same definitional distinction between domestic and inter-
national terrorism as TWEED. An attack is domestic if the nationality of the perpetrator is
the same as that of the country in which the attack takes place, regardless of the nationality
of the victim. Terrorist killings are differentiated from other types of criminal killings in
the following way:
“Terrorist violence is that carried out by underground groups with political
motivations. This excludes killings by underground groups without political
motivations (e.g. the mafia, narco groups) and killings by organizations that
liberate territory from a state’s control and become guerrilla insurgencies, as
they have different dynamics of violence to that of underground groups” (De la
Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2009, 2).
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What can be inferred from this definition and something particularly important to note
is that although “far-right” motivated violence almost always exhibits strong elements of
nationalism, formal nationalist/separatist movements and organizations are not typically
included in the categorization of right-wing inspired violence. For example, the Euskadi
Ta Askatasuna (ETA) of the Basque region of Spain and the Provisional Irish Republi-
can Army (PIRA) of Northern Ireland are nationalist/separatist paramilitary organizations
that, although engage in acts of terrorism, are often considered to be closer in definition to
guerrilla insurgencies and do not fit the motivational characteristics of right-wing terror-
ism. Attacks committed by these types of organizations are coded under the ideological
category “Nationalist (pro-secession)” in the DTV database and “Ethnic/Regionalist” in
TWEED. The DTV database includes two separate right-wing motivated attack variables.
The first is labeled simply, “right-wing terrorism” and the second is labeled “neo-nazi
terrorism.” A typical distinction between the two groups is the neo-nazi emphasis on el-
ements of fascism, however, I combine both variables as “extreme-right attacks” because
of the strong ideological similarities.
An interesting difference between the two datasets is that TWEED utilizes and event-
level approach while the DTV database is compiled at the level of the victim. Fortunately
each victim listed is associated with a specific attack event. Because of this, I was able
to capture the number of extreme-right attacks per country-year just as with TWEED.
However, this also means that only events that generated at least one death are included.
All events that resulted in zero deaths are not captured by this dataset, while they are
captured in TWEED. In one sense, this data is less ideal because it may more accurately
capture the lethality of attacks rather than the prevalence of attacks. However, the trade-off
is that the data include a potentially more accurate list of attacks than TWEED.
TWEED uses Keesing’s Record of World Events as its single data source containing
global coverage. Keesing’s provides continuous coverage of international news since
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1913. The majority of information this source provides comes from newspapers, news
magazines, and news services with occasional information from government and non-
government reports. The DTV database uses multiple country-level sources:
In some cases, there were already datasets of killings. In some other cases,
we have found lists of victims, chronologies, and documents prepared by as-
sociations of victims of terrorism, NGOs, web pages dedicated to the memory
of victims, local press reports, official lists of victims by state institutions,
monographs on terrorist organizations, and even documents produced by ter-
rorist organizations themselves or by political organizations somehow linked
to the terrorists (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2009, 12).
Although the DTV database only includes information on attacks in which at least
one death resulted, the associated information regarding all aspects of the attack (such as
ideology and location) is likely to be more reliable because of the cross-checking with
multiple coders across multiple country-level sources. TWEED does include non-lethal
attacks but may potentially suffer from a significant under-reporting bias since it uses only
one global-level source.
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Country Attacks (TWEED) Country Attacks (DTV)
Germany 127 Germany 86
Italy 81 Spain 85
Greece 64 Italy 75
Spain 36 United Kingdom 63
France 19 France 42
Austria 14 Belgium 15
Portugal 11 Portugal 12
Switzerland 9 Sweden 7
United Kingdom 5 Greece 5
Belgium 4 Netherlands 2
Sweden 3 Ireland 1
Norway 2 Austria 1
Netherlands 1 Switzerland 1
Denmark 1 Norway 1
Ireland 0 Luxembourg 0
Luxembourg 0 Denmark 0
Finland 0 Finland 0
Iceland 0 Iceland 0
Total 377 Total 396
Correlation = .40
Table 3.1: Extreme-Right Terrorist Attacks by Country, 1970 to 2004
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Figure 3.2: Extreme-Right Terrorist Attacks Across 18 Western European Countries, 1970
to 2004.
Table 3.2 above compares the total number of extreme-right attacks in 18 western eu-
ropean countries from 1970 to 2004 across both datasets and Figure 3.2 graphs the attacks
over time.4 The total number of attacks from all countries combined over the time period
is similar in both datasets, however, there is some variation worth noting. Germany, Italy,
4A list of terrorist organizations responsible for the attacks by country from both TWEED and DTV is
provided in Appendix A. In some cases, there are significant differences in the listing of terrorist groups
by country across both datasets. Again, although the authors of both datasets share the same understanding
of what constitutes a terror attack motivated by an extreme-right ideology, DTV codes solely based on the
victim level while TWEED codes solely based on the event level. Therefore, when transforming the DTV
data into an event-level variable, the events that are listed only include those that resulted in at least one
death. Groups that committed an attack that resulted in no deaths are then more likely to be listed under
TWEED and not under DTV. For example, TWEED lists the Volkstreue Ausserparlamentarische Opposition
and the Bayuvarische Befreiungs Armee as groups that committed right-wing terror attacks during the sample
period, while DTV only lists the Bayuvarische Befreiungs Armee. This is because the latter group committed
an attack that resulted in at least one death while the former did not result in any deaths. However, because
DTV used a wider variety of sources than TWEED when compiling the data, there will be more groups
listed under DTV in some cases.
53
Spain, and France consistently have the highest number of attacks, with Germany leading
the lead in both datasets. In fact, right-wing terrorists are responsible for 43.8% of all acts
of terrorism in Germany since 1950 and 57.5% percent of the terrorist fatalities. However,
only 20.6% of those attacks are attributed to formal right-wing terrorist organizations such
as the Deutsche Aktionsgruppen, Volkssozialistische Bewegung, and the Wehrsportgruppe
Hoffman. The rest were committed by right-wing extremists apparently unaffiliated with
a specific organization and this is especially so post German unification, particularly in
1991 and 1992 (Engene 2004). Right-wing extremists in Italy are responsible for roughly
15.5% of all terrorist acts since 1950 but also 54.4% of all terrorism fatalities. The more
violent organizations included Ordine Nero, Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari, and Movimiente
Sociale Italiano (Engene 2004).
Oddly, the DTV records 63 total extreme-right attacks in the United Kingdom while
TWEED only records 5, which is clearly a sizable discrepancy, particularly since we would
expect the DTV (which only records attacks with at least one fatality) to count fewer
incidents. In addition, TWEED records 64 total attacks in Greece while the DTV only
records 5. Again, this is a major difference. On the lower end of the scale, both datasets
assign zero attacks in Luxembourg, Finland, and Iceland. The incidents reported in rest of
the countries are fairly consistent across datasets.
3.4 Explanatory Variables
3.4.1 ∆ Net Migration
To measure immigration, I utilize the OECD’s International Migration Statistics. Im-
migration is measured by the net migration rate for each country in a given year.5 I cal-
5Counting the stock of foreign workers flowing from less developed states into the states used in this
sample might be a more direct measure of labor immigration. The OECD migration database does include a
measure of employed foreign workers by country of origin, however, the data are only available from 1990.
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culate the change in net migration from one year to the next in order to capture the total
influx of foreign minority populations.6
Figure 3.3 shows the net migration rate of all 18 Western European countries across the
full sample time period. It is clear that there is quite a degree of variability across countries
with many appearing not to conform with the overall trend presented in Figure 3.1. Every
country during at least one year in the sample period experienced a negative net migration
rate, meaning that the number of emigrants exceeds the number of immigrants in a given
year. Luxembourg experienced the highest average net migration rate over the sample
period (7,190 migrants) with Germany, Greece, and Spain close behind. The UK, Ireland,
France, and Portugal experienced the lowest average rate. Portugal, however, experienced
the greatest degree of variation in its net migration rate (with an overall range of -16,500
to 38,200 migrants), followed closely by Ireland, Germany, and Switzerland. Portugal and
Spain also experienced the highest average year to year influx of net migrants with 618
and 444, respectively.
6Utilizing the change in net migration as opposed to the level of migration into receiving states helps to
reduce cross-national heterogeneity by producing the same change across countries. In addition, migrants
tend to assimilate into the host society over time. Measuring sudden year to year influxes of migrants who
cannot be immediately absorbed by the system lowers the likelihood of capturing an assimilation process.
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Figure 3.3: Net Migration Rate in 18 Western European Countries, 1970 to 2004
3.4.2 Unemployment
Unemployment is also taken from the OECD’s statistical database and is measured as
the total number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the labor force. This is a com-
monly used indicator for capturing the slack in the labor market as well as for measuring
economic and social well-being. Because the literature on anti-minority sentiment and vi-
olence largely agrees that unemployment is a major economic factor contributing to these
outcomes, I also use this measure.
Figure 3.4 presents the national unemployment rate for each country throughout the
sample period. The OECD’s statistical database failed to report unemployment statistics
for several country-year periods, which is the largest contributor to the reduction in the
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overall sample size in the upcoming analyses. Spain has the highest average unemploy-
ment rate over the sample period with 13.81% and with a high of 19.5% in 1994. Ireland,
France, Italy, and Greece follow close behind with averages of 11.57%, 9.06%, 8.88%,
and 8.65%, respectively. Luxembourg experienced the lowest average rate of unemploy-
ment with an incredibly low 2.67%. Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland also experienced
very low unemployment rates of 3.41%, 3.50%, and 3.55%, respectively. Norway, Lux-
embourg, Sweden, and Norway can also be credited with having individual years under
2% unemployment.
Figure 3.4: Unemployment Rate in 18 Western European Countries, 1970 to 2004
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3.4.3 Extreme-Right Party Vote Share
To capture the salience of immigration in a country I use extreme-right political party
vote-share in national elections. This measure serves as a proxy for the national visibil-
ity of extreme-right political platforms, which are largely anti-immigrant. Greater vote
share should lead to a greater diffusion of anti-immigrant discourse due to heightened
national visibility. For example, Pim Fortuyn, leader of an extreme-right populist (and
staunchly anti-immigrant) party in the Netherlands, Lijst Pim Fortuyn, was consistently
presented with more opportunities for claim-making through the media when public sup-
port from opinion polls increased during the 2002 parliamentary election campaigning
period (Koopmans and Muis 2009).
This variable is measured as the percentage of national electoral support for both ex-
treme populist and neofascist political parties and is taken from Golder (2003). I use
Golder’s combined measure, which is created by determining the percentage of votes won
by both parties in the closest election prior to the year for which the calculation was being
made, then summing and dividing by the number of countries that had elections. Figure
3.5 presents the vote share percentages for these parties by country across the sample pe-
riod. Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland, and Iceland do not reach a sufficient level of votes to
register at the national level. It is interesting to note that these are the only four countries
that also happen to experience zero right-wing terrorist attacks during the sample period
according to TWEED. Austria, Italy, Norway, Denmark, and France tend to experience
the highest average extreme-right party vote shares with Austria having the highest overall
level in a single election.7 ∆ Net Migration, Unemployment, and Extreme-Right Party Vote
7Jorg Haider’s Freiheitliche Partei O¨sterreichs, FPO¨ (Freedom Party of Austria) won an incredible
26.9% of the vote in the 1999 legislative election, narrowly defeating the conservative christian democratic
O¨sterreichische Volkspartei, O¨VP (Austrian People’s Party).
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Share are multiplied creating a three-way interaction representing the economic opportu-
nity structure argument.
Figure 3.5: Extreme-Right Political Party Vote Share in 18 Western European Countries,
1970 to 2004
3.4.4 Spatial Lag, Wyit
The spatial lag variable captures the extent to which extreme-right attacks in one coun-
try can be attributed to extreme-right attacks occurring in geographically proximate coun-
tries. Typically, spatial autoregressive (SAR) models are denoted by the following equa-
tion: y = ρWy + Xβ + ε , where ρ is the estimated spatial lag coefficient and W is the n x
n spatial connectivity matrix, which appears as follows:
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W =

0 wi j wik
w ji 0 w jk
wki wk j 0

The most common connectivity matrix utilized in peace and conflict studies within
political science is a binary country-level matrix. The assumption is that the outcome of
interest is more likely to be related among units if those units are closer together. For ex-
ample, we might expect that violence in one country is more likely to spread to a bordering
country rather than one farther away. In the matrix above, each cell represents the spatial
relationship between two units given three units i, j, and k. If i, j, and k represent Sweden,
Norway, and Finland respectively and we are attributing a value of 1 or 0 for whether or
not two countries border one another (binary matrix), then each of the off-diagonal values
will equal 1 while the diagonal values will equal 0. Sweden, Norway, and Finland all
border one another however, they cannot border themselves.
Wy is constructed through a distance-based n x n row-standardized connectivity ma-
trix, Wi j, where countryi takes the value of the distance in kilometers from its capital to
the capital of country j.8 Wi j is multiplied by yit (yit being the number of extreme-right at-
tacks in countryi in yeart) to create the spatial lag. To create the main explanatory variable
8I chose not to use a binary contiguity matrix since it would drop two countries from the 18 country
sample (Iceland and Greece do not share a border with another country in the sample). However, the general
matrix set up is equivalent. Row-standardizing the weights matrix makes the spatial lag a weighted average
of extreme-right attacks across all countries i as opposed to a weighted sum (Plu¨mper and Neumayer 2010,
428-429). For example, consider a simple binary country contiguity matrix where states sharing a border
receive the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Imagine only three countries in the system/matrix: Norway, Sweden,
and Finland. Each of these countries shares a border with both of the others, meaning the off-diagonal values
in the matrix all receive a value of 1 and the diagonal values receive a value of 0. Now imagine in a given year
that Sweden experiences 3 right-wing attacks. This value is multiplied by the weights matrix and averaged
across contiguous countries so Finland and Norway would each receive a spatial lag value of 1.5. That
value of 1.5 represents the spatial effect of 3 attacks occurring in a geographically proximate area, with the
expectation that it should explain some variation in the number of attacks occurring in Finland and Norway.
If Sweden experienced 3 attacks and Norway experienced 6 attacks in the same year, Finland would receive
a value of 4.5 (6 + 3 / 2), Norway still a value of 1.5, and Sweden a value of 3 (6 / 2). Because I am working
with a distance-based connectivity matrix, the values of y are multiplied by distance in kilometers rather
than 0 or 1.
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capturing the spatial opportunity argument, I multiply the spatial lag, which incorporates
the number of attacks in country i (the neighboring country), with the change in the net
migration rate in country j.
3.5 Control Variables
I first control for Unemployment Entitlements. A major economic concern is the ex-
tent to which the unemployed are able to receive welfare benefits. This variable is defined
as the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rate. The OECD measures
this based on the cash replacement rates for two earning levels, three family situations, and
three durations of unemployment.9 The concern here is the potential for greater immigrant
populations to generate higher tax rates while receiving a disproportionate amount of the
unemployment entitlements. Regardless of whether this “fiscal burden” is actually occur-
ring, native individuals observing a reduction national welfare entitlements may attribute
this to a growing immigrant population.
I also include a number of controls found to be important in the empirical analysis
of terrorism. In measuring Income Inequality, I follow numerous terrorism studies us-
ing national Gini coefficients (Abadie 2006; Li 2005; Li and Schaub 2004; Piazza 2011).
Countries with highly unequal income levels tend to experience more terrorism, so I ex-
pect a positive relationship with right-wing terrorism. Countries with large populations
and large surface areas generate higher policing costs and have been found to positively
predict the incidence of terrorism (Eyerman 1998). To control for this I include the natu-
ral logs of both Population and the size of the Geographical Area of each country. I use
the most common measure of economic development GDP per capita. A positive finding
9Martin (2006); OECD (2007). The data are accessed through the following webpage:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd52/9/42625593.xls. The data are available biannually from 1971 to 2007. In
order to obtain annual data for the panel analysis, I follow others in interpolating the data by using the av-
erage values for one year before and after the missing observation (Blanchard 1998; Blanchard and Wolfers
2000; Lipsmeyer and Zhu 2011).
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would suggest that higher average incomes in more developed states facilitate the ability of
potential terrorists and terrorist organizations to plan and execute more successful attacks.
I also include a lagged value of the dependent variable, Previous Year Attacks, to make
sure incidents occurring in previous year are not the sole driver of attacks in the current
period. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the following analyses are included
in Table 3.3 below.
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Right-Wing Attacks (TWEED) 358 .50 3.93 0 65
Right-Wing Attacks (DTV) 358 .72 2.12 0 19
Spatial Lag (TWEED) 358 .62 1.18 0 8.12
Spatial Lag (DTV) 358 .63 .45 0 2.55
∆ Net Migration 358 .07 1.61 -8.80 8
Unemployment 358 7.32 3.90 1.40 19.5
Welfare Entitlements 358 31.75 13.01 0 65
Extreme-Right Party Vote Share 358 3.26 5.20 0 26.9
ln Income Inequality 358 32.63 4.10 25 45.2
ln Population 358 9.44 1.07 5.65 11.32
ln GDP Per Capita 358 9.57 .53 8.18 11.01
Table 3.2: In-Sample Summary Statistics
3.6 Model Specification
The following three equations specify models representing the economic opportunity
argument (equation 3.1), the spatial diffusion argument (equation 3.2), as well as a com-
bined model of the two (equation 3.3).
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yit = αit + γ(NetMigration)it +δ (Unemployment)it +ζ (ERVote)it (3.1)
+λ (NetMigration∗Unemployment)it +κ(NetMigration∗ERVote)it
+µ(Unemployment ∗ERVote)it +ψ(NetMigration∗Unemployment ∗ERVote)it
+Xitβ +φyt−1 + εit
yit = αit + γ(NetMigration)it +ρ(Wy)it +ξ (NetMigration∗Wy)it +Xitβ (3.2)
+φyt−1 + εit
yit = αit + γ(NetMigration)it +δ (Unemployment)it +ζ (ERVote)it (3.3)
+λ (NetMigration∗Unemployment)it +κ(NetMigration∗ERVote)it
+µ(Unemployment ∗ERVote)it +ψ(NetMigration∗Unemployment ∗ERVote)it
+ρ(Wy)it +ξ (NetMigration∗Wy)it +Xitβ +φyt−1 + εit
• yit is a vector of counts of extreme-right terrorist attacks in each country-year.
• NetMigrationit is the change in the net migration rate in each country-year with
parameter estimate γ .
• Unemploymentit is the national unemployment rate in each country-year with pa-
rameter estimate δ .
• ERVoteit is the percentage of national electoral support for extreme-right political
parties in each country-year with parameter estimate ζ .
• NetMigration∗Unemployment ∗ERVoteit is the three-way interaction representing
the main explanatory variable for the economic opportunity argument, with param-
eter estimate ψ .
• λ , κ , and µ represent the parameter estimates for for all subsequent two-way inter-
actions.
• Wyit is the spatial lag. W is the weights matrix containing the distance in kilometers
between each pair of countries in the sample.
• NetMigration∗Wyit is the interaction between the change in the net migration rate
in each country-year and the spatial lag, with parameter estimate ξ . This represents
the main explanatory variable for the spatial diffusion argument.
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• In equations 3.1 and 3.3, the X variables include all control variables: Unemploy-
ment entitlements, income inequality, ln population, and ln GDP per capita. In
equation 3.2, the X variables also include the net migration rate, unemployment,
and extreme-right political party vote share.
• yt−1 is a one year lag of extreme-right terrorist attacks, temporal autoregressive pa-
rameter φ .
• εit is the disturbance term.
3.7 Results and Discussion
Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the results of six statistical models testing the eco-
nomic and spatial opportunity arguments as well as a combined test. I use the count of
extreme-right terrorist attacks as the outcome derived from both the TWEED and DTV
database. Models 1 and 2 (Table 3.3) test the theoretical prediction that positive influxes
of net migration will lead to a greater likelihood of extreme-right terrorism as unemploy-
ment and immigration issue salience are rising. Models 3 and 4 (Table 3.4) test the the-
oretical prediction that positive influxes of net migration will lead to a greater likelihood
of extreme-right terrorism as attacks in geographically proximate areas increase. I present
the results of the combined tests in Models 5 and 6 (Table 3.5).
The explanatory variable of interest in both Models 1 and 2 is the three-way interaction
∆ Net Migration x Unemployment x ER Vote. The coefficient across both models is posi-
tive and significant, providing evidence for the economic opportunity argument associated
with hypothesis one. The first two-way interaction, ∆ Net Migration x Unemployment, is
insignificant in model 1 but positive and significant in model 2, providing some evidence
that a positive change in net migration leads to an increase in right-wing terrorism when
unemployment is rising and when extreme-right vote share equals zero. The three-way
interaction then suggests that this relationship becomes stronger as vote share increases,
as the theory predicts.
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The coefficient for ∆ Net Migration x ER Vote is negative and significant across both
models, meaning that a positive change in net migration leads to a decrease right-wing
terrorism when party vote share is rising and when unemployment equals zero. Although
there are no cases in the sample where there exists full national employment, we might
imagine a scenario in which migration reduces right-wing terror incidents because there
would be no economic justification (at least in terms of unemployment, which is what
is being captured) for attributing blame on migrants for declining economic conditions
because the economy is strong. If fact, the opposite might occur in which migrants are
praised for contributing to a strong economy, which is the direction this result is pointing
toward. The coefficient of the third two-way interaction, Unemployment x ER Vote is also
negative and significant in model 1 while insignificant in model 2.
The individual components of the interaction (∆Net Migration, Unemployment, Extreme-
Right Vote Share), each represent the relationship between that variable and right-wing
terrorism when the other two components of the interaction equal zero. For example, the
∆Net migration represents the relationship between net migration and right wing terrorism
when unemployment and extreme-right vote share equal zero. The coefficient is insignifi-
cant in model 1 and negative and significant in model 2. There are no observations in which
this scenario occurs in the sample, however, this relationship could again be demonstrating
the potential attribution of praise toward migrants for a strong economy. Unemployment is
insignificant across both models while extreme-right vote share is significant in model 1.
Although I make no specific predictions about the individual components and subsequent
two-way interactions in the model, the results, on the whole, appear to provide evidence
for the economic opportunity argument.
Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.4 test the spatial diffusion argument. The main variable of
interest is the interaction, ∆ Net Migration x Spatial Lag. The coefficient is insignificant in
model 3 but positive and highly significant in model 4, while the coefficient for the spatial
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lag as an individual component is not significant in either model. This result provides at
least some evidence for the the second hypothesis. A positive change in net migration
in country j will lead to a higher likelihood of right-wing terrorism in country j as the
number of attacks in countryi increases. The closer countryi is to country j in terms of
geographical distance, the higher the chances of observing this relationship. Again, I argue
that migration is serving as the motive for violence while the spatial lag is represents the
opportunity to act on the motive. Therefore, I would expect the individual components
of the interaction to have no effect. The coefficient on the spatial lag conforms to this
expectations across both models but again the ∆ Net Migration is negative and significant
in model 4.
The difference in the samples is likely accounting for the different finding of the main
spatial interaction variable across models (the coefficient from the DTV sample being
highly significant while that from the TWEED sample being insignificant). Because the
DTV data only include attacks resulting in at least one fatality, the measure may be a more
accurate representation of the ‘severity of attacks’ rather than as a pure indicator for the
‘number of events.’ However, this could be interpreted to conform well with the theory.
According to the cognitive heuristics framework, actors will be disproportionately influ-
enced by attention-grabbing events and fatalities resulting from an attack may be viewed
as a form of success, raising the likelihood that actors will be aware of the attack and there-
fore more likely to emulate the event. It may also create the perception that the government
is facing a tipping point, potentially forcing policy concessions.
Models 5 and 6 from Table 3.5 test both the economic and spatial opportunity argu-
ments together. The three-way interaction representing the economic opportunity expec-
tation is positive and significant across both models while the two-way interaction rep-
resenting the spatial diffusion expectation is insignificant across both models. Again, ∆
Net Migration x ER Vote is negative is consistently negative and significant while ∆ Net
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Migration x Unemployment is no longer significant. Migration and unemployment have
no independent effect on right-wing terrorism while extreme-right vote share does. Ulti-
mately, the test of the economic opportunity argument appears to outperform that of the
spatial diffusion argument.10 The independent test was originally insignificant in model 2
using the DTV data and became significant when incorporating the spatial model.
In terms of the controls across all six models, right-wing attacks in the previous year
significantly raise the likelihood of additional attacks in the following year. This is consis-
tent with findings across the more general quantitative domestic and transnational terror-
ism literatures. Terror attacks in and of themselves often help to legitimize the terrorist or-
ganizations in the eyes of national governments as real societal threats, generating greater
confidence in the likely effectiveness of future attacks as well as spurring on copy-cat
behavior among other like-minded terrorist organizations.
Welfare entitlements are not significantly associated with a greater risk of terror. Just
as unemployment has no significant effect on right-wing across models, it is not neces-
sarily surprising welfare benefits produce a similar result because it is being treated as
independent explanatory factor and does not model the conditional effect of immigration.
In other words, we cannot assume that the public is attributing declining welfare benefits
to immigrants when the variable is included as an independent factor, however, it is im-
10It is possible that the insignificant finding of the spatial argument is simply an artifact of the potential
irrelevance of “distance” as an indicator of the underlying mechanism of emulation. Since all 18 countries
in the sample are relatively close in geographic proximity and all are highly developed with widespread
communications technology, distance may not be a major factor in the whether news of a terrorist attack gets
transmitted to other audiences in the sample of countries. I created an alternative measure using the total
count of all extreme-right attacks across all countries in the previous year to replace the current spatial lag
as a robustness check, the results of which can be found in Appendix C. In a combined test of the arguments
in the TWEED sample, both the economic and spatial opportunity arguments are significant, however the
spatial lag by itself is still insignificant. The model using the DTV data produces insignificant effects for
both arguments, however the spatial lag by itself becomes highly significant. One could also argue that
non-white immigrants should have a stronger impact on the likelihood of terrorism what white immigrants.
I included a variable measuring the proportion of muslims in each country in the sample. It appears that the
lower the proportion of muslims, the greater the likelihood of an attack in the TWEED sample. The variable
is insignificant with the DTV data. The results are provided in Appendix D.
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portant to make sure that the relationship between the main interaction and the outcome is
not affected by the effects of a strong welfare state.
Income inequality, the size of the country’s population, and GDP per capita (when
using the DTV sample) are positively related to right-wing terrorism which corroborates
the broader terrorism literature. The common expectation is that greater disparities in
income should generate economic grievances leading toward a higher likelihood of vio-
lence. The literature tends to find economic development to be positively associated with
terrorism because the capacity to execute an attack is greater (Bloomberg and Hess 2008;
Bloomberg and Rosendorff 2009). The size of the population may also be associated with
enhanced recruitment opportunities.
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Model 1 Model 2
[TWEED] [DTV]
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
∆ Net Migration x Unemp. x ER Vote .020*** .003 .009** .004
∆ Net Migration x Unemp. -.025 .017 .021*** .005
∆ Net Migration x ER Vote -.110*** .020 -.050** .021
Unemployment x ER Vote -.018* .010 -.025 .016
∆ Net Migration .038 .126 -.228*** .056
Unemployment -.061 .053 .035 .027
Extreme-Right Vote Share .145** .069 .102 .101
Extreme-Right Attacks .038** .014 .118*** .045
Welfare Entitlements -.003 .014 .007 .013
ln Income Inequality .116* .061 .153*** .057
ln Population 1.266*** .279 1.183*** .224
ln GDP Per Capita .152 .407 1.271** .527
Constant -19.26*** 5.85 -30.19*** 5.27
Log-Pseudolikelihood -148.22 -251.80
χ2 27187.46*** 3602.64***
BIC -1726.462 -1519.299
Observations 358 358
Note: Explanatory variables are lagged one period. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Analysis: Economic Opportunity Argument.
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Model 3 Model 4
[TWEED] [DTV]
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
∆ Net Migration x Spatial Lag -.030 .143 .325*** .119
Spatial Lag .045 .049 .136 .276
∆ Net Migration -.164 .173 -.266*** .050
Unemployment -.095 .069 .026 .030
Extreme-Right Vote Share .055 .045 -.087** .034
Extreme-Right Attacks .036 .023 .131*** .043
Welfare Entitlements -.010 .011 .003 .012
ln Income Inequality .091 .061 .140** .056
ln Population .970*** .196 .991*** .187
ln GDP Per Capita .225 .477 1.132** .521
Constant -15.69*** 5.93 -26.37*** 5.86
Log-Pseudolikelihood -157.82 -257.70
χ2 15687.98*** 743.68***
BIC -1719.035 -1519.274
Observations 358 358
Note: Explanatory variables are lagged one period. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Table 3.4: Negative Binomial Analysis: Spatial Opportunity Argument.
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Model 5 Model 6
[TWEED] [DTV]
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
∆ Net Migration x Unemp. x ER Vote .021*** .003 .007* .004
∆ Net Migration x Unemp. -.024 .016 .011 .010
∆ Net Migration x ER Vote -.113*** .021 -.044** .020
Unemployment x ER Vote -.018* .010 -.026 .018
∆ Net Migration x Spatial Lag -.056 .077 .165 .159
∆ Net Migration .049 .109 -.227 .059
Unemployment -.057 .051 .039 .026
Extreme-Right Vote Share .145** .069 .110 .106
Spatial Lag .019 .046 .201 .335
Extreme-Right Attacks .040*** .013 .114*** .043
Welfare Entitlements -.004 .014 .006 .013
ln Income Inequality .112* .059 .158** .062
ln Population 1.255*** .275 1.188*** .218
ln GDP Per Capita .165 .416 1.228** .526
Constant -19.18** 5.87 -30.12*** 5.67
Log-Pseudolikelihood -148.08 -251.20
χ2 192260.79*** 5478.05***
BIC -1709.101 -1502.866
Observations 358 358
Note: Explanatory variables are lagged one period. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Table 3.5: Negative Binomial Analysis: Combined Test.
3.8 Substantive Effects
Although examining the the direction and conventional statistical significance levels
of the model coefficients is informative, I also investigate the impact that influxes of im-
migrants has on extreme-right terrorism under more meaningful values of the modifying
variables and examine the actual percentage increase in the estimated number of attacks
in the following country-year. Table 3.6 presents the estimated effect that a year to year
increase in 1,000 net migrants has on the number of extreme-right terrorist attacks in the
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receiving county under five meaningful and realistic scenarios of the modifying variables
while controlling for the additional explanatory factors presented in the regression mod-
els.11 The top half of the table presents the scenarios using the TWEED data in alignment
with model 5 while the bottom half of the table presents the same scenarios using the DTV
data and is derived from model 6.12
Rows one of both the top and bottom halves of Table 3.6 portray a scenario in which
1,000 net migrants lead to a decrease in the number of extreme-right attacks by 31.06%
and 25.99%, respectively, when unemployment is equal to the natural employment rate of
1.4%and extreme-right party vote is held at zero. The 90% confidence intervals indicate
that this relationship is significant. It is important to establish a baseline scenario to more
meaningfully compare contexts that are more likely to occur.
In the second scenario, an increase of 1,000 net migrants leads to a 24.14% (TWEED)
and 16.44% (DTV) increase in the expected number of extreme-right attacks when the
national unemployment rate raises to one standard deviation above the sample mean (from
7.32% to 11.22%) and extreme-right party vote remains at zero.13 So even in periods when
immigration is not nationally salient, immigrant inflows can have an effect on right-wing
terrorism when unemployment is rising. This means that immigration does not need to be
a salient national policy issue for the extreme-right to act. Scenario three shows a 31.47%
and 19.24% decrease in the expected number of attacks when unemployment is held at
1.4% and extreme-right party vote share is raised to one standard deviation above the sam-
ple mean (from 3.26% to 8.46%). One would expect this scenario to not produce positive
11The modifying variables are centered with a mean of zero and with standard deviations as the unit of
change.
12The estimated percentage impacts are calculated using Incident Rate Ratios (IRRs), which are the ex-
ponentiated coefficients of the negative binomial regression results (from models 5 and 6) with centered
modifying variables. This technique provides a more meaningful way of interpreting continuous x continu-
ous interaction terms in the negative binomial context and is recommended by Hilbe (2011, 528).
1310.05% of the country-years in the sample experience conditions in which the unemployment rate is at
least 11.22% while having recorded an extreme-right party vote share of zero. Examples include Ireland and
Spain throughout much of the 1980s and 90s as well as Finland from 1992 to 1998.
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and significant results because the theory argues that immigration salience only creates
an opportunity for the extreme-right to act when there exists an obvious economic threat
that can be attributed to migrants or an inept and unresponsive government. However, the
theory would also not necessarily predict a negative and significant effect either.
When both unemployment and extreme-right party vote are raised to one standard de-
viation above the sample mean there is a 38.99% and 17.07% increase in the expected
number of attacks in a given country-year, which are significantly higher likelihoods than
when only one modifying condition is present. These results help to substantiate the theo-
retical expectations derived from the economic opportunity argument. It is clear that both
modifying conditions (unemployment and vote share) do not need to necessarily be present
together for immigration to have a significant effect on right-wing terrorism. However, an
increase in the value of both conditions clearly having a multiplying effect on the outcome.
Positive influxes of immigrants are more likely to increase the expected number of attacks
when unemployment and vote share are high as opposed to when only one is high, which
supports hypothesis one.
The fifth and final scenario shows a decrease of 6.81% and an increase of 7.27% in
the expected number of attacks when the value of the spatial lag is raised to one standard
deviation above its sample mean (1.80 in TWEED and 1.08 in DTV). A spatial lag value of
one or above generally means that at least one neighbor experienced at least one extreme-
right attack in the previous year. In one case we observe a positive effect and in the other
a negative effect but the results are insignificant in both cases. Although the interaction
is significant under the DTV sample of Model 4, the combined model in table 3.5 reveals
that the true data generating process is through the economic opportunity argument. The
substantive effects show this as well.
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3.9 Concluding Remarks
This chapter provided a statistical analysis of the competing theoretical arguments
made in chapter two across 18 western European countries from 1970 to 2004. Over-
all, the findings suggest that the economic opportunity structure appears to outperform the
spatial opportunity structure in predicting the likelihood of extreme-right terrorism. Con-
forming with the fundamental components of the theoretical outline, the results show that
the extreme-right are unlikely to carry out an attack when solely driven by the motive of
rising immigration levels. There must also exist a perceived window of opportunity that
will increase both individual and group significance gain, which will generate some per-
ceived legitimacy for action. In other words, extreme-right attacks are unlikely to occur
as a response to rising immigration levels unless immigration is presented as a tangible
economic threat and perceived as a salient policy issue by the broader population.
In contrast, the results provide no support for the spatial opportunity argument. Al-
though the motive for action here (rising immigration levels) stays the same, members of
the extreme-right are not more likely to carry out an attack when the perceived window
of opportunity is conceived as the potential for the emulation of behavior rather than an
economic-based opportunity for retribution. Even when a right-wing attack occurs in a
country nearby, this attack does not appear to serve as an opportunity for another group
to engage in an attack even when immigration levels have increased significantly. The
geographical distance of an ideologically similar attack does not appear matter, regardless
of whether or not the attack occurred in a bordering country. This lack of support for
the spatial opportunity argument could be due to the lack of legitimacy perceived by the
potential terrorists for acting on the motive. An attack occurring in a nearby country may
simply not be enough of an opportunity to legitimize taking action on the motive of rising
immigration levels. However, an ideologically similar attack occurring within the same
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country’s borders may be enough to legitimize taking action on the motive. Chapter four
tests these same competing arguments at the subnational level in England.
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Variable Unit Change in Effect on Terrorism [90% C. I.]
Modifying Variables (TWEED)
1. ∆ Net Migration Unemployment = 1.4 - 31.06% [-.414, -.108]
Extreme-Right Vote = 0
2. ∆ Net Migration Unemployment + 1 sd. + 24.14% [.042, .233]
Extreme-Right Vote = 0
3. ∆ Net Migration Unemployment = 1.4 - 31.47% [-.534, -.275]
Extreme-Right Vote + 1 sd.
4. ∆ Net Migration Unemployment + 1 sd. + 38.99% [.279, .490]
Extreme-Right Vote + 1 sd.
5. ∆ Net Migration Spatial Lag + 1 sd. -6.81% [-.213, .083]
Variable Unit Change in Effect on Terrorism [90% C. I.]
Modifying Variables (DTV)
1. ∆ Net Migration Unemployment = 1.4 - 25.99% [-.383, -.045]
Extreme-Right Vote = 0
2. ∆ Net Migration Unemployment + 1 sd. + 16.44% [.019, .217]
Extreme-Right Vote = 0
3. ∆ Net Migration Unemployment = 1.4 - 19.24% [-.292, -.043]
Extreme-Right Vote + 1 sd.
4. ∆ Net Migration Unemployment + 1 sd. + 17.07% [.013, .244]
Extreme-Right Vote + 1 sd.
5. ∆ Net Migration Spatial Lag + 1 sd. + 7.27% [-.043, .188]
Note: Percentage impacts are Incident Rate Ratios from the Negative Binomial regression results
with centered modifying variables.
Table 3.6: Substantive Impacts on Extreme-Right Terrorism.
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4. SUB-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF ENGLAND
In 1999, David Copeland, also known as the “London nail bomber” and a former
member of the British National Party (BNP) and National Socialist Movement, carried out
what was perhaps the most horrific act of extreme-right terrorism in the country’s history.
Over a 13 day period, Copeland placed homemade nail bombs in heavily populated areas
specifically targeting black, Bangladeshi, and gay communities, resulting in the death of
three people and injuring over 130 others. Although this was a particularly severe case
of extreme-right inspired violence, the broader extreme-right political movement within
England has existed since the 1960s and has been associated within numerous violent
attacks inspired by the movement’s ideological goals (Goodwin 2012b).
Significant extreme-right sentiment in England began with the rise of the National
Front (NF) in 1967, which was an extreme-right political movement driven by opposi-
tion to immigration. The party only allowed white membership and its most recognized
proposed policy was to repatriate all non-white immigrants. Although the party experi-
enced some local council level success it was ultimately unsuccessful at the national level
without ever being able to win a single seat in Parliament even after fielding over 300 can-
didates in the 1979 general election (Thurlow 1998). However, the British National Party
emerged in 1982 as a political party and general movement that derived much of its ideo-
logical goals from the National Front. The party contested national elections throughout
the 1980s and 1990s but also was largely unsuccessful. Though, the party did begin to
achieve electoral success in the 2000s when in 2005 it rallied roughly 200,000 voters and
elected 50 local councillors. In 2008, the party succeeded in electing two members to the
European Parliament.
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A consequence of this electoral success appeared to inspire several more radical groups
with increasingly narrow interests and a greater proclivity for violence such as Combat 18
and the Racial Volunteer Force. These groups present the political movement as a struggle
for national and particularly racial survival amidst a liberal state constructed multicultural
world. The groups want to protect and expand the the White Race and continue to polarize
societal views around this specific issue hoping to incite a racial war that will rid the
country of foreigners once and for all. The discourse is apocalyptic and there is little
obvious organizational structure. The overall movement is fragmented and has a large
peripheral following rather than a large set of core members.1
There is also strong evidence that support for these groups is highest within majority
white wards within more racially diverse local authorities (Bowyer 2008). What is more
concerning is the number of these supporters who are also apparently supportive of vi-
olence as a tactic to resolve or achieve their political agenda. In one of the few studies
conducted attempting to measure the propensity for violence among extreme-right sup-
porters, Goodwin and Evans (2012) found that among survey respondents (respondents
were self-identified extreme-right BNP supporters) 35 percent of BNP supporters strongly
agreed that “violence may be needed to protect my group from threats,” 22 percent be-
lieved that “preparing for inter-group conflict” is always justifiable, 12 percent believed
that “armed conflict” was always justifiable, and finally, 60 percent strongly agreed that
“violence between different ethnic, racial or religious groups is largely inevitable.” This
phenomenon is continuing to grow with the more recent emergence of the English Defense
League (EDL), which is most prominently anti-Muslim, and there is little sign that the cur-
rent government will pursue any type of immigration-related policies in acquiescence to
the demands of the movement.
1See the Racial Volunteer Force website: http://www.rvfonline.com/
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In this chapter I test the economic and spatial opportunity structure arguments at the
administrative region-year level in England. When analyzing events like terrorist attacks
at the state level that actually occur on an individual or group level, there is always the
possibility that the findings will at least partially be influenced by the ecological fallacy
of drawing inferences at a different unit of analysis than is being tested. A cross national
analysis of interstate war, for example, is reasonable since the units of interest are the states
carrying out the act of war themselves. The study of terrorism is slightly different since
terrorism (the events themselves) are carried out by subnational entities, not the state. It
may therefore be appropriate to see whether the findings of the cross national analysis hold
under a devolved level of analysis.
A second reason for testing these arguments at the subnational level is due to the ob-
servation that the results of the cross-national analyses slightly improve when the U.K.
is excluded. Although the results presented in chapter three do accurately represent the
average effects at the more macro country-level, the slight improvement in results when
excluding this particular country may suggest that there could be something substantively
different about the U.K.2
A final reason for studying an individual country case is due to the way in which the
spatial opportunity structure can be modeled. The spatial opportunity structure may have
been insignificant in the cross national analysis because the “opportunity” was defined
as an attack occurring in a different country, which may not have been perceived as a
legitimate enough reason to act on the motive. A subnational analysis would allow for the
test of the spatial argument at units within the same country, which may lead to greater
legitimacy in acting on the motive.
I first present the research design and empirical method used to test the theoretical
arguments as well as a discussion of the variables and their measurements. I then discuss
2The negative binomial results excluding the U.K. can be found in Appendix E.
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the results of the empirical analysis and present their substantive effects. Finally, I provide
several concluding remarks concerning the results, limitations of the study, and potential
implications.
4.1 Research Design and Method
To estimate the conditional effect of net migration on extreme-right terrorism in Eng-
land I utilize a cross-sectional time-series data structure across nine English administrative
regions from 1998 to 2005. Because the outcome of interest is measured as the number of
terrorist attacks in a given administrative region-year, I employ a standard negative bino-
mial regression model with robust standard errors clustered over regions.
In determining the cross-sectional unit of a sub-national analysis of political phenom-
ena in England, one can choose among roughly four levels of analysis. The first are admin-
istrative regions, of which there are nine.3 Regions are the highest tier of subdivision used
by the central government. This level is particularly useful in this context because they are
the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) European Union recognized
geocoded standard for sub-national statistical data. The majority of economic and political
data in England are reported either at the country level or at the regional level and tend for
the most part capture the longest time period of data.
The second tier of governmental devolution is at the county level, of which there are
83. Within counties exist a third tier of devolution in which there are 326 districts. Districts
are categorized as either metropolitan, non-metropolitan, or unitary authorities and each
are designated a particular degree of governmental power that can be exercised. Finally,
the lowest tier of government consists of parishes. There are over 10,000 local parishes
which can be either classified as a civil (simply administrative) parish or an ecclesiastical
3The nine English administrative regions include the North East, North West, Yorkshire and the Humber,
East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, and South West regions.
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parish (under the care and jurisdiction of a parish priest) and often appear in the form of
towns and villages.
Although there would be clear advantages to working with a lower level governmental
unit than the regional level, there are two main limitations. The first is based on the depen-
dent variable. Terrorism is a relatively rare phenomenon with only 41 attacks occurring
in the sample period. Extreme-right terrorism in England, although occurring every year,
does not occur enough to meaningfully analyze it across 83 units (county level), let alone
236 (districts), or even 10,000 units (parishes). An exceptionally high percentage of units
would experience no attacks (at least with the current measurement of extreme-right at-
tacks). However, if one were to analyze racially-based hate crimes, thousands occur each
year across the vast majority of lower level units. The dependent variable is limiting in this
sense and is the most important reason for selecting the regional level. A second limitation
is related to the explanatory variables. Consistent economic and political data are not well
kept and reported across lower tier units. The data that does exist is only among selected
counties and for very limited time periods. My empirical strategy therefore resulted from
these limitations.
4.2 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the count of extreme-right ideologically motivated domestic
terrorist attacks in a given country-year. As mentioned in Chapter three, only two datasets
provide the ideological motivation for domestic attacks during this time period and, in
this case, in England specifically: The Terrorism in Western Europe Events Database
(TWEED) and the Domestic Terrorist Victims (DTV) Dataset.4 Because the purpose of
this chapter is to analyze the proposed theoretical argument at the sub-national level in
England rather than at the cross-national level, the location of the attacks must be speci-
4See Engene (2006, 2007) and De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2009, 2011) for database codebooks
and additional information.
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fied at a sub-national level as well. Unfortunately, TWEED does not provide the specific
location of an attack within a country. However, the DTV does include the total count of
domestic terrorist incidents by city-year. Sometimes the closest municipality, or county is
used rather than the city. I was then able to aggregate the attacks by English region-year.
This resulted in my use of the DTV for the statistical analysis rather than TWEED.
Figure 4.1 shows the number of extreme-right attacks in England from 1998 to 2005.
The years 1999 and 2000 experienced the highest number of attacks throughout the period
while 2003 and 2004 were exhibited the fewest attacks and each year in the sample expe-
rienced at least two attacks. The numbers also vary by region. London experienced the
most attacks by far out of all regions during the time period with 17 total attacks, followed
by the South West region with nine and the North West region with seven attacks. Two
regions, the East of England and the South West region, experienced no attacks throughout
the sample period.
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Figure 4.1: Right-Wing Terror Attacks in England, 1998 to 2005
4.3 Explanatory Variables
Net Migration is measured as the total inflow of migrants minus the total population
outflows in each English administrative region by year. These data come from the UK Of-
fice for National Statistics Long-Term International Migration Time-Series, 1991-2011.5
Migrant inflows are based on area of destination within the UK by English regional ad-
ministrative areas. The data include migrant inflows and population outflows to determine
year to year differences in net migrant populations by region.
Figure 4.2 shows the net migration rate for the nine English administrative regions
from 1998 to 2005. There is a significant amount of variation across the regions but only
four of the nine regions experienced a population contraction (where the number of emi-
5These data can be extracted from the following website: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/index.html
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grants exceeded the number of immigrants) in at least one year during this time period.6
London experienced the highest average net migration rate with a yearly average of 86,130
migrants and a maximum of 103,000 in the year 2000. Although there was a significant
drop in net inflows from 2001 to 2003, at no point during the sample period did the yearly
number of migrants drop below 71,000. Yorkshire and the Humber and the South East
regions were a distant second and third with a yearly average of 18,000 and 16,750 net mi-
grants, respectively. Yorkshire and the Humber experienced perhaps the most consistent
and steady growth of net migrants of all the regions throughout the sample period, while
the South East experienced dramatic year to year changes, dropping from 24,000 to just
5,000 met migrants in a single year, for example.
Regions with the lowest yearly average of net migrants were the North East and the
South West, with rates of 3,130 and 5,750, respectively. At no point did either region
experiences net inflows of more than 13,000 in a single year.
6North East in 2003 (-3,000), North West in 1999 (-5,000), East Midlands in 1999-2000 (-3,000 each
year), and South West in 2003 (-3,000).
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Figure 4.2: Net Migration Rate by English Administrative Region, 1998 to 2005
Unemployment is measured as the estimated percentage of the population unemployed
in each English administrative region by year. The data are taken from the Labour Force
Survey (LFS) carried out by the Office for National Statistics (ONS).7 The data are season-
ally adjusted and are updated each month to give a time series of three month averages up
to and including the latest three month period for the UK and each UK country (England,
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland) and English region. I averaged the quarterly data
to produce yearly unemployment estimates.
Figure 4.3 shows the unemployment rate across the nine administrative regions from
1998 to 2005. In contrast to net migration rates, there is far less regional variation in
unemployment rates throughout the sample period. This is not the case historically, where
7These data can be extracted from the following website: https://statswales.wales.gov.uk/
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the United Kingdom experienced unemployment rates as high as 13% during parts of the
1980s and hovered around 10% during the early 1990’s, which was higher than the western
European average during that time. Since the mid 1990s, England has experienced a steady
decline in unemployment with little variation across regions.
The North East region experienced the highest average unemployment rate over the
sample period with 7.45%, followed closely by London with 7.18% unemployment. Both
regions also experienced the highest single year unemployment rate with 9.3% (North East
in 1999) and 8.1% (London in 1998). However, the regions with the greatest variation in
unemployment rates across the time period were the North East (range: 5.8% to 9.3%),
North West (range: 4.5% to 6.9%), and Yorkshire and the Humber (range: 4.7% to 7.1%).
The South East and South West regions exhibited the lowest unemployment rates over the
time period with 3.78% and 3.88%, respectively. They also had the least variation in rates
over time with the South East ranging from a low of 3.3% to a high of 4.3% and the South
West ranging from a low of 3.3% to a high of 4.7%. Overall, the regional unemployment
rates are quite low and do not exhibit anywhere near the amount of variation seen at the
country level across western Europe in the previous chapter.
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Figure 4.3: Unemployment Rate by English Administrative Region, 1998 to 2005
Immigration Salience is captured by counting the number of articles published per year
in the national newspaper, The Guardian, that mention the words “immigration” and/or
“immigrants.” This is the same technique used by Hopkins (2010, 2011) to measure the
national salience of immigration in the United States. To capture the salience of immigra-
tion in the previous chapter analyzing the argument in a cross-national context, I used a
measure of the extreme-right political party vote share in national elections. In some ways,
the media coverage of immigration may be a more internally valid measure of immigra-
tion salience in a country because it captures year to year variation in popular exposure to
immigration-based stories, rather than variation across only election years. Also to quote
Koopmans and Olzak (2004) again, “...The diffusion chances of violence against the target
will improve, even if nobody in the public debate refers to the target group by taking an
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explicitly negative stand.” Simply introducing a policy topic into the public sphere will
result in the polarization of viewpoints, which present arguments for and against the pol-
icy issue being introduced, resulting in the issue being more salient than if the policy issue
had not been introduced via the national media. However, the downside of this measure
is that it does not directly measure who truly cares about the issue of immigration like the
percent of the national population voting for extreme-right political parties more closely
captures.
Figure 4.4 shows the monthly count of articles published in The Guardian specifically
mentioning the words “immigration” and/or “immigrants.” The Guardian published the
highest number of articles mentioning immigration in 2001 with 74 articles, followed by
63 articles in 2002. 1999 produced the fewest articles with 18 over the course of the year.
Over the 96 month period from 1998 to 2005, the monthly average of number of articles
published mentioning immigration was 3.74 with a standard deviation of 2.80 articles and
a maximum of 15 articles in a given month with a minimum of zero. Monthly highs
during the sample period include May, 2001 (15 articles), August, 2001 (12 articles), May,
2002 (14 articles), and February 2009 (10 articles). Months during the sample period
in which zero articles referring to immigration were published include December, 1998,
April, 1999, and June, 2005.
88
Figure 4.4: Monthly Count of Mentions of “Immigration” and “Immigrants” in The
Guardian, 1998 to 2005
Spatial Lag, Wyit−1. This variable captures the extent to which extreme-right attacks in
one administrative region can be attributed to attacks in geographically contiguous regions
occurring in the previous year. Wy is constructed as an n x n row-standardized binary
contiguity matrix, Wi j, where regioni takes a value of one if it shares any part of its border
with region j and zero otherwise. Wi j is then multiplied by yit−1 (which is the number of
extreme-right attacks in regioni in the previous year) to create the overall spatial lag. I then
multiply the spatial lag by the net migration rate in region j to test the second hypothesis
derived in chapter two.
89
4.4 Control Variables
Average Income. These data show the average gross weekly household earnings in
pounds by English administrative regions in April of each year. The figures are taken
from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) run by the Office for National
Statistics (ONS).8 The methodology applies weights to the results to take into account the
structure of the population in terms of age, gender, occupation, and area of workplace.
Population measures the annual estimated resident population statistics for each English
region, produced by the Office for National Statistics.9
In addition, I control for the regional vote share of the Conservative and Labour po-
litical parties as a percentage of total vote share in each election period during in the
sample. Regional election results were taken from the British Parliamentary Constituency
Database, 1992-2005, complied by Pippa Norris.10 The election years included 1997,
2001, and 2005. Finally, I control for the Previous Year Attacks in each region as this
typically has a strong influence on future events. Tables 4.1 to 4.10 below present the
in-sample summary statistics for all regions combined as well as each separate region.
8These data can be extracted from the following website: https://statswales.wales.gov.uk/
9These data can be extracted from the following website: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/index.html.
10These data can be extracted from the following website: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm.
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Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Right-Wing Attacks (DTV) 63 .59 1.16 0 6
Spatial Lag (DTV) 63 .60 .61 0 2.34
Net Migration 63 18.27 25.87 -5 103
Unemployment 63 5.37 1.48 3.3 9.3
Salience 63 3.74 .42 2.94 4.32
% Labour Vote 63 45.07 10.16 26.68 61.38
% Conservative Vote 63 32.91 6.31 21.68 42.4
ln Income 63 6.07 .15 5.84 6.50
ln Population 63 8.57 .33 7.83 9.00
Table 4.1: Full In-Sample Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Right-Wing Attacks (DTV) 8 .125 .35 0 1
Spatial Lag (DTV) 8 .56 .68 0 1.5
Net Migration 8 3.13 3.68 -3 8
Unemployment 8 7.45 1.27 5.8 9.3
Salience 8 3.75 .42 2.94 4.32
% Labour Vote 8 57.69 3.68 50.64 61.38
% Conservative Vote 8 22.79 1.08 21.68 23.79
ln Income 8 5.97 .09 5.84 6.11
ln Population 8 7.84 .01 7.83 7.86
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics: North East
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Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Right-Wing Attacks (DTV) 8 .88 1.13 0 3
Spatial Lag (DTV) 8 .25 .35 0 1
Net Migration 8 7.38 6.97 -5 16
Unemployment 8 5.44 .81 4.5 6.9
Salience 8 3.75 .42 2.94 4.32
% Labour Vote 8 53.55 2.83 47.46 56.03
% Conservative Vote 8 26.18 .33 25.84 26.48
ln Income 8 6.04 .09 5.91 6.17
ln Population 8 8.83 .01 8.81 8.84
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics: North West
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Right-Wing Attacks (DTV) 8 .25 .71 0 2
Spatial Lag (DTV) 8 .42 .50 0 1.34
Net Migration 8 18 9.50 2 31
Unemployment 8 5.59 .83 4.7 7.1
Salience 8 3.75 .42 2.94 4.32
% Labour Vote 8 50.81 2.63 45.20 53.16
% Conservative Vote 8 27.81 .85 26.91 28.59
ln Income 8 6.01 .10 5.86 6.15
ln Population 8 8.52 .01 8.51 8.53
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics: Yorkshire and the Humber
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Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Right-Wing Attacks (DTV) 8 .25 .46 0 1
Spatial Lag (DTV) 8 .53 .49 0 1.2
Net Migration 8 7.75 8.01 -3 17
Unemployment 8 4.74 .38 4.3 5.4
Salience 8 3.75 .42 2.94 4.32
% Labour Vote 8 46.16 2.79 39.86 48.37
% Conservative Vote 8 36.18 1.00 34.98 36.98
ln Income 8 6.01 .10 5.88 6.14
ln Population 8 8.35 .01 8.34 8.37
Table 4.5: Summary Statistics: East Midlands
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Right-Wing Attacks (DTV) 8 .38 .74 0 2
Spatial Lag (DTV) 8 .56 .50 0 1.25
Net Migration 8 10.50 4.87 4 18
Unemployment 8 5.75 .61 4.8 6.8
Salience 8 3.75 .42 2.94 4.32
% Labour Vote 8 46.62 2.80 40.39 48.93
% Conservative Vote 8 33.56 .20 33.36 33.75
ln Income 8 6.04 .09 5.91 6.16
ln Population 8 8.58 .01 8.57 8.59
Table 4.6: Summary Statistics: West Midlands
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Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Right-Wing Attacks (DTV) 8 0 0 0 0
Spatial Lag (DTV) 8 1.17 .64 .34 2.34
Net Migration 8 12.63 4.63 7 19
Unemployment 8 4.01 .37 3.7 4.8
Salience 8 3.75 .42 2.94 4.32
% Labour Vote 8 36.52 2.86 29.96 38.70
% Conservative Vote 8 40.19 1.41 38.50 41.29
ln Income 8 6.11 .10 5.96 6.24
ln Population 8 8.60 .01 8.58 8.62
Table 4.7: Summary Statistics: East of England
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Right-Wing Attacks (DTV) 8 2.13 2.03 0 6
Spatial Lag (DTV) 8 .56 .68 0 2
Net Migration 8 86.13 11.89 71 103
Unemployment 8 7.18 .43 6.7 8.1
Salience 8 3.75 .42 2.94 4.32
% Labour Vote 8 48.53 3.58 40.07 50.95
% Conservative Vote 8 29.96 .46 29.6 30.92
ln Income 8 6.41 .11 6.25 6.55
ln Population 8 8.90 .02 8.88 8.93
Table 4.8: Summary Statistics: London
94
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Right-Wing Attacks (DTV) 8 1.13 1.36 0 4
Spatial Lag (DTV) 8 .55 .51 0 1.6
Net Migration 8 16.75 7.29 5 26
Unemployment 8 3.78 .34 3.3 4.3
Salience 8 3.75 .42 2.94 4.32
% Labour Vote 8 31.62 2.04 26.57 32.35
% Conservative Vote 8 42.26 1.09 41.30 44.61
ln Income 8 6.18 .10 6.02 6.29
ln Population 8 9.00 .01 8.99 9.01
Table 4.9: Summary Statistics: South East
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Right-Wing Attacks (DTV) 8 0 0 0 0
Spatial Lag (DTV) 8 .75 .80 0 2
Net Migration 8 5.75 5.23 -3 13
Unemployment 8 3.88 .51 3.3 4.7
Salience 8 3.75 .42 2.94 4.32
% Labour Vote 8 26.39 1.23 23.36 26.93
% Conservative Vote 8 37.79 .88 36.72 38.43
ln Income 8 6.03 .10 5.89 6.16
ln Population 8 8.51 .01 8.50 8.53
Table 4.10: Summary Statistics: South West
4.5 Model Specification
The following three equations specify models representing the economic opportunity
argument (equation 4.1), the spatial diffusion argument (equation 4.2), as well as a com-
bined model of the two (equation 4.3).
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yit = αit + γ(NetMigration)it +δ (Unemployment)it +ζ (Salience)it (4.1)
+λ (NetMigration∗Unemployment)it +κ(NetMigration∗Salience)it
+µ(Unemployment ∗Salience)it +ψ(NetMigration∗Unemployment ∗Salience)it
+Xitβ +φyt−1 + εit
yit = αit + γ(NetMigration)it +ρ(Wy)it +ξ (NetMigration∗Wy)it +Xitβ (4.2)
+φyt−1 + εit
yit = αit + γ(NetMigration)it +δ (Unemployment)it +ζ (Salience)it (4.3)
+λ (NetMigration∗Unemployment)it +κ(NetMigration∗Salience)it
+µ(Unemployment ∗Salience)it +ψ(NetMigration∗Unemployment ∗Salience)it
+ρ(Wy)it +ξ (NetMigration∗Wy)it +Xitβ +φyt−1 + εit
• yit is a vector of counts of extreme-right terrorist attacks in each administrative
region-year.
• NetMigrationit is the net migration rate in each administrative region-year with pa-
rameter estimate γ .
• Unemploymentit is the unemployment rate in each administrative region-year with
parameter estimate δ .
• Salienceit is the logged number of articles published in the Guardian that mention
either “immigration” and/or “immigrants” in a given year with parameter estimate
ζ .
• NetMigration∗Unemployment ∗Salienceit is the three-way interaction representing
the main explanatory variable for the economic opportunity argument, with param-
eter estimate ψ .
• λ , κ , and µ represent the parameter estimates for for all subsequent two-way inter-
actions.
• Wyit is the spatial lag. W is the binary weights matrix containing whether or not
each administrative region is territorially contiguous with the other regions.
• NetMigration∗Wyit is the interaction between the net migration rate in each admin-
istrative region-year and the spatial lag, with parameter estimate ξ . This represents
the main explanatory variable for the spatial diffusion argument.
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• In equations 4.1 and 4.3, the X variables include all control variables: regional un-
employment rate, average income, population, the percent of the regional vote for
the Labour party and the percent of the regional vote for the Conservative party. In
equation 4.2, the X variables include, in addition to those listed above, the regional
unemployment rate, and immigration salience.
• yt−1 is a one year lag of extreme-right terrorist attacks by region, temporal autore-
gressive parameter φ .
• εit is the disturbance term.
4.6 Results and Discussion
Table 4.11 presents the results of the results of the three negative binomial models
testing the economic and spatial opportunity arguments as well as a combined test. The
outcome of interest is the count of extreme-right terrorist attacks as measured by the Do-
mestic Terrorist Victims database in all three models. Model 1 tests the economic op-
portunity argument, which predicts that an increase in net migration rates will lead to a
greater likelihood of extreme-right terrorism as unemployment and immigration salience
rise. Model 2 tests the spatial opportunity argument, which predicts that an increase in
net migration will lead to a higher likelihood of extreme-right terrorism as attacks in geo-
graphically proximate regions increase. Finally, Model 3 presents a combined test of both
arguments.
First, the controls are very consistent across all models. As expected, the larger the
population in a given administrative region, the greater the likelihood of an extreme-right
attack. Also conforming to the norms throughout the terrorism literature is the finding
that the lower the average income by region, the greater the likelihood of terrorism. These
results are consistent and similarly strong across all three models. The percent of the re-
gional population voting for the labor and conservative parties are consistently positive
but insignificant except in the single case of Model 1, where the percent voting for the
conservative party barely achieved a conventional standard of statistical significance. Fi-
nally, and what is particularly odd is the negative coefficients associated with the previous
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years’ attacks. In all three models, a greater number of attacks in the previous year led
to a decrease in the number of attacks in the current year. The finding is likely to be an
artifact of such a limited time frame combined with less than ideal variation in the number
of attacks across that time period.
The explanatory variable of interest in Model 1, representing the economic opportu-
nity argument is the three-way interaction, Net Migration x Unemployment x Salience.
The coefficient is negative and marginally significant, which runs counter to the theo-
retical prediction. This model suggests that an increase in the net migration rate leads
to a decrease in extreme-right terrorism as unemployment and immigration salience rise.
However, the two-way interaction, Net Migration x Unemployment generates a positive
and significant coefficient. This means that an increase in the net migration rates leads
to a higher likelihood of attacks as unemployment rises and when immigration salience
is held at zero. This might initially suggest that the measure of immigration salience is
negatively affecting the three-way interaction but the two-way interaction, Net Migration
x Salience, is also positive and significant. This means that an increase in the net migra-
tion rate also leads to a higher likelihood of terrorism when the salience of immigration
is rising and when the unemployment rate is held at zero. Both unemployment and im-
migration salience appear to drive the positive results in the two-way interactions but are
independently insignificant in the full model and when included together in the three-way
interaction, which appears to generate the negative coefficient. The results of Model 1 do
not support the economic opportunity argument.
Model 2 presents the results of the spatial opportunity argument. The explanatory
variable of interest is the two-way interaction, Net Migration x Spatial Lag. The coeffi-
cient here is positive but insignificant, meaning that the effect of the net migration rate on
extreme-right terrorism is not conditional on the regional geographical proximity of the
previous years’ attacks in this model, which does not support the prediction of hypothesis
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two. The net migration rate as an independent factor in the model is the effect of migration
on the outcome when the spatial lag is equal to zero. The spatial lag as an independent
factor is the effect of the lag when the migration rate is equal to zero. Both variables are
insignificant. The unemployment rate and immigration salience as controls in this model
are also insignificant independent predictors of extreme-right terrorism. It is important to
note that this may be due to the low degree of variation, particularly in the unemployment
rate. There is greater variation across regions (9.3% North East; 3.78% South East) than
there is by each region over the entire sample period. The region that exhibited the greatest
variation in unemployment over time was the North East with a rate that ranged from 5.8%
to 9.3%. The unemployment rate for all regions steadily declined over the sample period
and ultimately experienced very little variation, especially compared to the cross-national
sample of countries in chapter three. This could ultimately explain the insignificance of
the variable across the models.
Model 3 presents the results of the combined test. Interestingly, and in contrast to the
cross-national findings in chapter 3, there is support for the spatial opportunity argument
but not support for the economic opportunity argument. The coefficient for Net Migration
x Spatial lag is positive and significant while the coefficient for the three-way interaction
representing the economic opportunity argument became insignificant.11 In an attempt to
shed more light on these effects beyond the direction of the relationship and conventional
levels of statistical significance, I generate a series of substantive effects in the following
section.
11It is important to note that the Variance Inflation Factors of several variables greatly exceeded the con-
ventional standard of 10, indicating significant multicollinearity. This may be have contributed to the in-
significant findings.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Net Migration x Unemp. x Salience -.034* -.025
(.019) (.029)
Net Migration x Unemp. .122* .097
(.066) (.099)
Net Migration x Salience .250** .179
(.124) (.204)
Unemployment x Salience -.085 -.368
(.782) (1.137)
Net Migration x Spatial Lag .012 .025*
(.013) (.014)
Net Migration -.857* .019 -.660
(.444) (.012) (.713)
Unemployment .192 .063 1.007
(2.544) (.322) (3.700)
Salience -1.393 -.949 .045
(3.687) (.941) (5.706)
Spatial Lag -.484 -.714
(.736) (.685)
Extreme-Right Attacks -.618*** -.399** -.653*
(.222) (.171) (.388)
ln Income -4.619*** -3.268** -4.449***
(1.285) (1.309) (1.535)
ln Population 5.374*** 4.855** 5.029***
(1.746) (2.080) (1.843)
% Labor Vote .182 .188 .160
(.111) (.135) (.114)
% Conservative Vote .207* .243 .187
(.123) (.159) (.119)
Constant -29.426 -36.546 -29.344
(30.337) (26.906) (38.271)
Log-Pseudolikelihood -46.259 -48.127 -45.022
BIC -110.495 -115.047 -100.539
Observations 63 63 63
Note: Explanatory variables are lagged one period. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Table 4.11: Negative Binomial Analyses.
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4.7 Substantive Effects
Similar to the cross-national analysis, this section presents the impact of net migration
on the percentage increase in the estimated number of extreme-right terrorist attacks in
the following region-year under more meaningful values of the modifying variables. To
estimate the percentage impacts I calculate the Incident Rate Ratios (IRRs), which are the
exponentiated negative binomial regression coefficients. The modifying variables are cen-
tered at their mean and I use standard deviations as the unit of change. Table 4.12 presents
the estimated effect that an increase in roughly 25,000 (sample standard deviation change)
net migrants has on the number of extreme-right terrorist attacks in a given administra-
tive region-year in England under five separate scenarios of the modifying variables while
controlling for the additional explanatory factors presented in the regression models.
Scenario one presents the effect of a change in 25,000 net migrants on the estimated
number of extreme-right attacks when unemployment is set to the natural employment rate
of 1.4 percent and salience is held at zero. This specification is derived from Net Migration
as the independent component in the three-way interaction of Model 3 from the previous
regression analysis. Under this scenario there is a 106.74 percent increase in the estimated
number of attacks in a given region year, which is statistically significant. Scenario two
shows the effect of this change in migration on terrorism under a one standard deviation
increase in the unemployment level while holding immigration salience at zero. This gen-
erates a 5.12 percent increase in the estimated number of attacks, yet this is statistically
insignificant. Scenario three presents the effect of migration when immigration salience
changes by a one standard deviation increase while unemployment is held at 1.4 percent.
This generates a 326.90 percent increase in the estimated number of attacks but again is
insignificant. In the fourth scenario, when both modifying variables increase by one stan-
dard deviation, the effect of net migration creates a 22.49 percent decrease in the estimated
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number of attacks, which conforms to the regression analysis but does not provide support
for the economic opportunity argument. The final scenario presents the substantive impact
of the regression coefficients representing the spatial opportunity argument. In this case an
increase in 25,000 net migrants leads to a 46.48 percent increase in the estimated number
of attacks when the value of the spatial lag increases by one standard deviation. This result
is statistically significant.
Variable Unit Change in Effect on Terrorism [90% C. I.]
Modifying Variables
1. Net Migration + 1 sd. Unemployment = 1.4 + 106.74% [-1.522, 2.975]
Salience = 0
2. Net Migration + 1 sd. Unemployment + 1 sd. + 5.17% [-.402, .503]
Salience = 0
3. Net Migration + 1 sd. Unemployment = 1.4 + 326.90% [-1.278, 4.181]
Salience + 1 sd.
4. Net Migration + 1 sd. Unemployment + 1 sd. - 22.49% [-.731, .221]
Salience + 1 sd.
5. Net Migration + 1 sd. Spatial Lag + 1 sd. + 46.48% [.010, .754]
Note: Percentage impacts are Incident Rate Ratios from the Negative Binomial regression results
with centered modifying variables.
Table 4.12: Substantive Impacts on Extreme-Right Terrorism.
4.8 Concluding Remarks
This chapter provided a statistical analysis of the competing theoretical arguments
across nine administration regions from 1998 to 2005 in England. In contrast to the strong
evidence for the economic opportunity argument found in the cross-national analysis, the
results from the subnational analysis provide evidence for the spatial opportunity argu-
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ment. The likelihood of extreme-right terrorism in England significantly increases when
there exists both a motive (rising immigration levels) and an opportunity structure that is
defined by the number of previous right-wing attacks occurring in geographically contigu-
ous administrative regions in England. Again, rising year to year immigration levels alone
do not have an independent effect on the outcome. In addition, the spatial lag also has
no independent effect on the likelihood of right-wing terror attacks. Only in combination
does the likelihood of extreme-right terrorism appear to increase.
The insignificance of the economic opportunity argument could largely be due to a
high degree of multicollinearity in the models as well as the low degree of variation in
the unemployment rate. These effects are ultimately a function of the limited time frame
and few units, which resulted in a very small number of observations on which to test
these complex claims. It is also important to note that the spatial lag could be reflecting
both a simple random clustering process resulting in an observed spatial pattern of attacks
as well as reflecting an emulation process, where members of the far-right learn from
attacks occurring nearby and emulate that behavior. However, I do believe that there is a
greater chance of emulation occurring rather than clustering. The spatial lag by itself is not
significant. It only becomes significant when it is multiplied by net migration, as predicted
by the spatial opportunity hypothesis. It would be far less likely to observe this result if,
in fact, only random clustering were occurring and not an emulation process. Ultimately,
these considerations mean that we should take the results of this chapter with a grain of
salt.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I utilized two broad theoretical conditions (motive and opportunity)
as a rational framework to explain the prevalence of extreme-right ideologically motivated
terrorism. The concepts of motive and opportunity either in combination or separately as
theoretical conditions have been used frequently in the literature on political violence at
large. However, I defined these two broad conditions in a way that is specific to explaining
the decision-calculus involved in carrying out an act of terrorism motivated by an extreme-
right ideology.
the overall theoretical framework builds on the radicalization framework of Kruglanski
et al. (2014) by applying similar theoretical conditions to the specific context of extreme-
right terrorism. A goal of significance is activated among members of the far-right when
they either individually or collectively experience a loss of significance. In this case, the
loss of significance was conceived as a threat to the ideology by rising immigration levels,
which then served as a motive for retribution. The quest to regain that significance was
conceived as the economic and spatial opportunity structures.
Rising immigration levels into a host country generate a perceived threat to both the
far-right ideology and the significance of the individuals or groups themselves associated
with the ideology. This creates an initial motive for violence. Drawing on existing argu-
ments, I then conceived of an opportunity structure in two distinct ways: First, a domestic
economic opportunity structure may arise when a significant aspect of the economy is
declining and when immigration becomes a nationally salient issue. These conditions pro-
duce an opportunity for action by creating a context in which immigration can be linked
to a declining economy. Second, a spatial opportunity structure may arise when extreme-
right attacks occur in proximate geographical areas. Attacks that occur nearby may legit-
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imate subsequent attacks, serve as a template for emulating that behavior, and may also
create the perception among the potential terrorists that the government is reaching a tip-
ping point.
Overall, the empirical analyses produced mixed findings. In chapter three, the cross-
national analysis covering 18 western European countries from 1970 to 2004 produced
strong evidence for the economic opportunity argument and no evidence for the spatial
opportunity argument. Results were highly consistent across models as well as across
two separate measures of extreme-right terrorism. The substantive effects also showed
clear significant increases in the expected number of attacks as the elements that made up
the opportunity structure (unemployment and immigration salience) increased in value in
combination with a positive influx of immigrants.
This finding builds on resource competition-based arguments made in comparative
politics as they relate to predicting different types of violence by showing that the typical
causes we attribute to violent outcomes may be conditional and not direct. For example,
a long research tradition in race and ethnic politics has attempted to determine whether
or not immigration is directly related to negative or positive societal outcomes such as
anti-immigrant sentiment and race-based hate crimes or increased economic welfare. The
findings here show that the relationship between immigration and right-wing terrorism is
not necessarily direct but conditional on other factors, making it a more complex decision-
calculus than is generally described in most studies of violence in political science.
This finding may also contribute to the political opportunity structure literature, which
argues that political elites and institutions can serve to mobilize the extreme-right by pub-
licly describing and thus shaping the perceived ethnic and cultural differences between
natives and foreign minority groups. The incident rate ratios from the combined empirical
test of the cross-national sample revealed that an increase of 1,000 net migrants in a single
year when unemployment rose to one standard deviation above its mean level in a given
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country led to a 14.73% increase in the expected number of extreme-right attacks. The
expected number of attacks rose to 46.96% when the national extreme-right political party
vote share increased to one standard deviation above its mean. So although rising levels
of extreme-right party vote share are not a necessary condition for right-wing terrorism to
occur, it appears to have a dramatic effect on the likelihood of terrorism.
However, the subnational analysis of administrative regions in England in chapter four
provided a different set of findings. The results indicated support for the spatial opportu-
nity argument and no support for the economic opportunity argument. What most likely
accounts for the difference in findings between analyses is what is being captured by the
spatial lag in the cross-national format versus the subnational format. The prediction made
with the spatial lag in the cross-national setting is that members of the far-right are more
likely to emulate attacks carried out in geographically closer countries. The potential issue
here is that because those attacks are carried out in other countries, it may not be enough
of a perceived window of opportunity to emulate the attack considering the different lan-
guages spoken, the different immigrant groups perceived as a threat, and the different
historical relationship with immigration. Those attacks may appear, on the surface, to be
entirely unrelated to one’s own relationship with immigration and therefore, not legitimate
enough to be an opportunity in which to emulate that attack. However, these characteris-
tics are more greatly shared when the attack to emulate occurs within one’s own country
border, even if in a different administrative region. The results also appear to suggest this
is the case.
There is also the simple difference in lag construction. The cross-national spatial lag
was based on distance in kilometers from each country’s capital city, which was the only
way to construct the lag in order to keep all 18 countries in the sample analysis. The sub-
national spatial lag was based on administrative region contiguity. In addition, there may
just be something uniquely different about England. When England is removed from the
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cross-national analysis, the results that were reported become slightly stronger, indicating
that England may, in fact, behave differently. However, it is difficult to know whether
this is altogether the case or if the difference in findings does stem from a cross-national
versus subnational construction of the spatial lag. There were also several methodological
limitations that may have, at least to some extent, played a role in the mixed findings.
5.1 Limitations
As in any empirical study of social phenomena, the analyses in this dissertation were
limited in several ways that are worth noting. The first obvious limitation was the sample
of countries used in the cross-national analysis. Western Europe has historically been the
central hub of right-wing inspired violence, mostly due to the well known rise and fall
of fascist regimes in Germany and Italy. The overwhelming majority of qualitative and
quantitative published studies in related issue areas have been on either individual coun-
tries or small groups of countries in western Europe. However, it is true that this region is
not the only one experiencing extreme-right terrorism. Nearly all countries with any kind
of competitive electoral system and who allow the entrance of foreigners for permanent
residence experience some form of politically oriented anti-immigrant sentiment.
Unfortunately, the two databases I used in the cross-national analysis are the only two
major databases that have coded the ideological affiliation of domestic terrorist organiza-
tions at the terror event level. These data collections are limited to western Europe. Only
as of January, 2015 has open source data been made available that is of comparable use
in the United States case.1 The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is probably the most
well-known collection of domestic and international terror attacks but does not code the
ideological affiliation of the groups committing the attacks. One could attempt to code this
by matching the name of the groups listed in the GTD with the groups listed by country
1See the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), compiled by Freilich et al. (2014), and Arie Perliger’s
original collection, Perliger (Forthcoming) and Perliger (2013).
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in the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) database, however there is surprisingly little
consistent overlap between the groups listed in both databases.
Even in one managed to successfully code this data, a further issue arises with the
international migration data as well as with limitations in the other covariates. The in-
ternational migration, unemployment, welfare entitlements, and other economic variables
come from the OECD statistics hub, meaning that only OECD countries are included. All
OECD countries are required to report their immigration data but very few countries out-
side of the OECD maintain consistent immigration records or make them publicly avail-
able. This is further complicated by the fact that many countries define what it means
to be an immigrant in different ways, which leads to alternative data collection strategies.
Those countries that do make their immigration data publicly available almost never report
year to year inflows and outflows, rather only three or five year averages, and almost none
began reporting this prior to 1990.
A second limitation was the lack of micro-level evidence for my proposed theory. I
used administrative regions in the subnational analysis of England, rather than counties
or districts. Because I make a theoretical argument that, at least in part, exists at the
individual or group level, it is always beneficial to be able to create an empirical model
that more closely aligns with this unit of observation. The downside of using the nine
administrative regions as the unit of analysis rather than the 83 counties or the 326 districts
is the lack of variation captured. Unfortunately, I was limited to the administrative region
level because of the small number of right-wing terrorist attacks throughout the sample
period. Although there were thousands of racially-based hate crimes, there were under 60
right-wing terrorist attacks according to the coding scheme of the DTV. Therefore, very
few counties or districts would have been coded with a right-wing attack in any given
country-year, which would dramatically reduce the amount of variation across those units.
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However, future research could analyze highly related outcomes such as violent crimes
against immigrants or racially or religiously motivated hate crimes. Thousands of these
incidents occur each year in the United Kingdom and are collected by local police authori-
ties into a publicly available aggregated database. In this way, one could easily incorporate
group and individual-level dynamics to test the implications of my argument at this level.
A third limitation was in the measurement of the salience of immigration. In the cross-
national analysis, immigration salience was approximated by the measure of extreme-right
political party vote share by country-year. In the subnational analysis, salience was mea-
sured as the number of mentions of “immigrants” and/or “immigration” per year in the
Guardian newspaper. Although these may be reasonable approximations, this measure
could be improved by conducting a content analysis of the specific language used in vari-
ous extreme-right party speeches, public statements, and through a wider variety of news
sources. Extreme-right party websites could also be scrapped for recent updates on mes-
sages or platforms specific to immigration. These might serve as more direct measures of
the concept.
Finally, the empirical test of the spatial opportunity argument was limited due to the
inherent bias in the construction of the spatial lag itself. Because, in the cross-national
analysis, the spatial lag included only the influence of countries within the actual sample,
it assumes that each country in the sample is unaffected by countries outside of the sample.
In other words, if right-wing attacks occur in the United States or in eastern Europe, they
will have no impact on the likelihood of right-wing attacks in western Europe, which
is unlikely to be true. The construction of the lag in the subnational analysis then also
assumes that right-wing attacks outside of England have no influence on the likelihood of
attacks in the English regions.
In addition, a strict relationship based on geographical distance was imposed on the
likelihood of emulation. In the cross-national sample, the greater the number of attacks
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occurring in one country, the greater the likelihood in the expected number of attacks in
another country in the sample. However, this effect is weighted by each country’s distance
in kilometers from one another, where closer distances have a greater influence. Although
geography-based connectivity matrices are, by far, the most common in political science,
it may not be as useful for the study of terrorism due to the proliferation of communica-
tions technology such as the internet, cell phones, and associated social media platforms,
particularly in the advanced industrial states of western Europe. Fortunately, there are
innumerable ways in which one could conceive and potentially measure alternative spa-
tial influences. For example, rather than geographical distance, far-right groups may be
more likely to emulate attacks occurring in countries with similar immigrant groups, sim-
ilar institutional structures, extreme-right political presence or success, and by language
similarities.
5.2 Implications
The theoretical argument and empirical findings have implications relevant to policy-
makers and to the academic study of terrorism more broadly. There is evidence for an
indirect relationship between international migration and extreme-right terrorism. Large
influxes of migrants into a state does not appear to solely affect the likelihood of attacks,
rather the evidence here suggests that the relationship is contingent upon an economic op-
portunity structure in the cross-national setting and a spatial opportunity structure in the
subnational setting. There is little evidence to suggest that international migration rates
will halt any time soon. In fact, migration rates are likely to continue to rise with the
continual liberalization of political institutions, particularly in such liberal democracies
as those represented in western Europe. At the same time, we have recently witnessed
uncharacteristic economic instability in this region with significant currency depreciation
and dramatically high rates of unemployment. If these economic trends continue along
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with the the current migration patterns, then the argument presented here would predict
a higher rate of attacks in the future. The increasing success of extreme-right political
parties as a result of these conditions would only serve to exacerbate this problem.
In terms of the broader study of terrorism, the basic theoretical framework developed
here could be applied to a variety of types of violence. By using a decision-theoretic based
approach, one can simply first determine the type of violence (e.g. left-wing terrorism,
separatist violence, regime-challenging insurgency, etc.) of interest, theorize about the
specific motive for the violence and then identify the opportunity structure(s) most relevant
to enhancing one’s ability to act on the motive. Very few quantitative studies have sought
to identify the specific explanatory factors that account for a particular type of terrorism.
Left-wing terrorism is still occurring regularly as are a variety of special interest attacks.
As I argued in Chapter two, terror attacks that occur based on a radical interpretation of
Islam, or are due to ethnic tension, or are based on anti-globalization policies, or are an
attempt to prevent animal and environmental cruelty are unlikely to have the same cause.
Instead of grouping them together as domestic or international terror events and attribute
to them the same explanatory factors, we should continue to group and define each event
based on similar ideological or other characteristics in order to more accurately determine
their specific triggers. This type theoretical framework could then serve as a useful tool.
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APPENDIX A
EXTREME-RIGHT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
Country TWEED DTV
Right-wing extremists; Bayuvarische Befreiungs Armee.Austria
Volkstreue Ausserparlamentarische Opposition;
Bayuvarische Befreiungs Armee.
Right-wing extremists; Neo-nazi extremists;Belgium
Front de la Jeunesse. De Bende van Nijvel;
National Front for the Liberation of Belgium.
Right-wing extremists.Denmark
Finland
Right-wing extremists; Right-wing extremists;France
Club Charles Martel; Neo-nazi extremists;
Oganization Delta; Club Charles Martel;
Faisceaux Nationalistes Europeens; Organization Delta;
Honneur de la Police; Honneur de la Police;
Ordre et Justice Nouvelle; Mouvement Nationaliste Revolutionnaire;
Mouvement Nationaliste Revolutionnaire; Parti Nationaliste Francais et Europeen;
SOS France/Commandos of France. Front National;
Batallon Vasco Espanol;
Alianza Apostolica.
Right-wing extremists; Neo-nazi extremists.Germany
Wehrsportgruppe Hoffman;
Deutsche Aktionsgruppen;
Volkssozialistische Bewegung Deutschlands/
Partei der Arbeit;
Free Korps
Right-wing extremists; Neo-nazi extremists;Greece
National Front; Elliniko Ethniko Sosialistiko Komma;
Organismos Ethnikis Anorthosoos;
Secret Yellow Organization of Air Force Officers. Chrysi Avgi.
Iceland
Neo-nazi extremists.Ireland
Right-wing extremists; Right-wing extremists;Ireland
Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari; Neo-nazi extremists;
Ordine Nero; Avanguarda Nazionale;
Movimiento Sociale Italiano; Ordine Nero;
Squadre d’Azione Mussolini; Movimento Sociale Italiano;
Avangardia Nazionale; Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari;
Vangardia Operaia; Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari-terza posizione.
Popular Brigade–New Order;
Falange Armata.
Table A.1: Extreme-Right Terrorist Organizations in Western Europe, 1970 to 2004
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Country TWEED DTV
Luxembourg
Nordelijk Terreurfront. Neo-nazi extremists.Netherlands
Nasjonalt Folkeparti; Neo-nazi extremists.Norway
Boot Boys.
Exercito de Libertacao Portuges. Right-wing extremists;Portugal
Neo-nazi extremists.
Right-wing extremists; Right-wing extremists;Spain
Alianza Apostololica Anticomunista; Neo-nazi extremists;
Fuerza Nueva; Batallon Vasco Espanol;
Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey; Alianza Apostolica.
Spanish National Socialist Party;
Fifth Adolf Hitler Commando.
Right-wing extremists; Neo-nazi extremists;Sweden
Vi som byggde Sverige. Nationalistiska Republikanska Armen.
Autonome Zellen; Orden der Arischen Ritter.Switzerland
Socialist-Nationalist Movement.
Right-wing extremists. Neo-nazi extremists.United Kingdom
Table A.2: Extreme-Right Terrorist Organizations Continued
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APPENDIX B
EXTREME-RIGHT POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1970-2004
Country Extreme-Right Political Parties Country Extreme-Right Political Parties
Freedom Party (since 1986). Northern League;Austria Italy
Piedmont-Regional Autonomy;
Venetian League;
Lombard League;
Italian Social Movement (until 1994).
Flemish Bloc;Belgium
National Front.
Luxembourg
Progress Party. Center Party;Denmark Netherlands
Center Democrats.
Progress Party.Finland Norway
National Front; Christian Democratic Party;France
Other extreme-right.
Portugal
New Force.
Republicans; National Alliance;Germany
National Democratic Party;
Spain
National Union.
Union of German People.
National Political Union; New Democracy.Greece
National Democratic Union;
Sweden
National Alignment;
National Party;
Party of the Progressives.
Swiss Motorist’s Party;Iceland Switzerland
League of Tessins;
National Actions;
Vigilance;
Swiss Democrats.
National Front;Ireland U. K.
British National Party.
Table B.1: Extreme-Right Political Parties in Western Europe, 1970 to 2004
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 3: SPATIAL LAG ROBUSTNESS CHECK
Model 5 Model 6
[TWEED] [DTV]
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
∆ Net Migration x Unemp. x ER Vote .018*** .003 .005 .006
∆ Net Migration x Unemp. -.001 .015 .017** .007
∆ Net Migration x ER Vote -.091*** .021 -.034 .025
Unemployment x ER Vote -.018* .010 -.027* .016
∆ Net Migration x Spatial Lag .005** .002 -.004 .013
∆ Net Migration -.319* .173 -.121 .287
Unemployment -.055 .048 .038* .022
Extreme-Right Vote Share .144** .067 .118 .095
Total Attacks .002 .009 .049*** .019
Extreme-Right Attacks .052*** .018 .085** .043
Welfare Entitlements -.002 .014 .009 .015
ln Income Inequality .124** .060 .179** .070
ln Population 1.259*** .265 1.291*** .224
ln GDP Per Capita .164 .398 1.102** .547
Constant -19.703*** 5.579 -31.240*** 6.220
Log-Pseudolikelihood -147.225 -247.293
BIC -1710.812 -1510.675
Observations 358 358
Note: Explanatory variables are lagged one period. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Table C.1: Negative Binomial Analysis: Spatial Lag Robustness Check.
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APPENDIX D
CHAPTER 3: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL RESULTS INCLUDING THE PROPORTION
OF MUSLIMS
Model 5 Model 6
[TWEED] [DTV]
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
∆ Net Migration x Unemp. x ER Vote .022*** .004 .008* .004
∆ Net Migration x Unemp. -.024 .016 .010 .011
∆ Net Migration x ER Vote -.119*** .022 -.048** .023
Unemployment x ER Vote -.027** .012 -.030 .019
∆ Net Migration x Spatial Lag -.063 .083 .130 .161
∆ Net Migration .043 .118 -.206*** .071
Unemployment -.056 .053 .031 .023
Extreme-Right Vote Share .186** .075 .125 .106
Spatial Lag .024 .045 .172 .333
Extreme-Right Attacks .038*** .012 .112** .044
Welfare Entitlements .012 .017 .013 .009
ln Income Inequality .087 .057 .148** .064
ln Population 1.430*** .308 1.266*** .255
ln GDP Per Capita .109 .428 1.241** .556
% Muslim -.489* .283 -.220 .248
Constant -19.463*** 6.395 -30.543*** 6.322
Log-Pseudolikelihood -146.340 -250.474
BIC -1672.587 –1464.319
Observations 353 353
Note: Explanatory variables are lagged one period. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Table D.1: Negative Binomial Analysis: Includes the Proportion of Muslims
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APPENDIX E
CHAPTER 3: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL RESULTS EXCLUDING THE U.K.
Model 5 Model 6
[TWEED] [DTV]
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
∆ Net Migration x Unemp. x ER Vote .020*** .003 .009** .004
∆ Net Migration x Unemp. -.015 .010 .013 .010
∆ Net Migration x ER Vote -.114*** .019 -.055*** .020
Unemployment x ER Vote -.023*** .009 -.030 .019
∆ Net Migration x Spatial Lag .009 .058 .122 .167
∆ Net Migration -.018 .079 -.169*** .043
Unemployment -.070 .056 .012 .022
Extreme-Right Vote Share .145** .061 .107 .110
Spatial Lag -.005 .043 .044 .378
Extreme-Right Attacks .027** .013 .072** .035
Welfare Entitlements -.012 .011 -.004 .012
ln Income Inequality -.015 .051 .063 .042
ln Population 1.536*** .187 1.415*** .200
ln GDP Per Capita -.835* .437 .548 .371
Constant -7.581 5.089 -21.848*** 4.266
Log-Pseudolikelihood -135.12 -228.877
BIC -1571.889 -1384.378
Observations 334 334
Note: Explanatory variables are lagged one period. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Table E.1: Negative Binomial Analysis: Combined Tests Excluding the U.K.
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